marc.geddes.domain.name.hidden wrote:
...
> Different levels of Causality
>
> Brain processes are enacting things which are *mathematical* in nature
> - 'algorithms' (See 'Functionalism'). Mathematical entities are
> abstracted patterns. But abstracted patterns themselves (like
> 'algorithms') don't exist directly inside physical causal networks,
> only particular instances of them do. This is clear by pointing to the
> fact that many different brains could enact the *same* computation
> (algorithm) - the philosophical term is that the algorithm is 'multiply
> realizable'. So the particular physical processes in the brain can't
> be *identical* to the mathematical entity (the algorithm) itself.
But is it true that different brains can implement the same algorithm? It seems it
is only true because we abstract a certain algorithm from it's various
representation, e.g. as written on paper. Every actual realization, in brains or
computer or on paper is actually slightly different at a microscopic level at least.
We call it "the same algorithm" because we're abstracting a common functionality or
purpose.
>
> It was an argument similar to this that led to the demise of the
> original 'Identity Theory' of mind (a theory which attempted to
> identity mental states with physical processes). Again, the trouble is
> that many different brain states could be associated with the *same*
> algorithm (or have the same mental states) which shows that physical
> processes cannot be identified with mathematical entities in any simple
> way.
But this only shows that mathematical objects exist in the sense that chair exists;
as a abstraction from chairs. So chair isn't identical with any particular chair.
>The weaker 'Token Identity' theories concede this, but still
> attempt to equate mental states with physical processes. Couldn't one
> simply say that there's some general high-level properties of physical
> matter which can be equated with the algorithm, and hence dispense with
> ghostly mathematical entities? The reason one can't really say this
> boils down to Occam's razor and inference to the best explanation
> again. Attempting to replace the concept of 'algorithm' with some high
> level properties of physical matter is results in descriptions that are
> enormously complex and unwieldy.
But you can look at it the other way around. The "algorithm" is already the general
high-level property that is common to all the brains and computers implementing.
....
>
> The Mathematico-Cognition Ontology
This looks more like botany than ontology.
Brent Meeker
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Received on Thu Sep 07 2006 - 00:26:24 PDT