RE: computationalism and supervenience

From: Stathis Papaioannou <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2006 19:25:00 +1000

Peter Jones writes:

> > > > > But if implementing a particular computation depends on an observer, or
> > > > > a dicitonary,
> > > > > or somesuch, it is not the case that everything implements every
> > > > > computation unless
> > > > > it can be shown that evey dictionary somehow exists as well.
> > > >
> > > > The computation provides its own observer if it is conscious, by definition.
> > >
> > > But "providing its own observer", if computationalism is true,
> > > must be a computational property, ie. a property possesed
> > > only by particular programmes. However, if any system
> > > can be interpreted as running every programme, everysystems
> > > has the self-observation property, if interpretedt he right way.
> > >
> > > IOW, one you introduce interpretation-dependence, you can't get away
> > > from it.
> >
> > That's right: if there is at least one physical system, then every computation is implemented, although we can only
> > interact with them at our level if they are implemented on a conventional brain or computer, which means we have
> > the means to interpret them at hand. The non-conscious computations are "there" in the trivial sense that a block of
> > marble contains every possible statue of a given size.
>
> All the computations are merely potential, in the absence of
> interpreters and dictionaries,
> whether conscious or not.
>
> > The conscious computations, on the other hand, are there and
> > self-aware
>
> Not really. They are just possibilities.
>
> > even though we cannot interact with them, just as all the statues in a block of marble would be conscious
> > if statues were conscious and being embedded in marble did not render them unconscious.
>
> But that gets to the heart of the paradox. You are suggesting that
> conscious
> computations are still conscious even thought hey don't exst and
> are mere possiiblities! That is surely a /reductio/ of one of your
> premisses

A non-conscious computation cannot be *useful* without the manual/interpretation, and in this sense could be called just a potential computation, but a conscious computation is still *conscious* even if no-one else is able to figure this out or interact with it. If a working brain in a vat were sealed in a box and sent into space, it could still be dreaming away even after the whole human race and all their information on brain function are destroyed in a supernova explosion. As far as any alien is concerned who comes across it, the brain might be completely inscrutable, but that would not make the slightest difference to its conscious experience.
 
> > > > then it can be seen as implementing more than one computation simultaneously during the
> > > > given interval.
> > >
> > > AFAICS that is only true in terms of dictionaries.
> >
> > Right: without the dictionary, it's not very interesting or relevant to *us*. If we were to actually map a random physical
> > process onto an arbitrary computation of interest, that would be at least as much work as building and programming a
> > conventional computer to carry out the computation. However, doing the mapping does not make a difference to the
> > *system* (assuming we aren't going to use it to interact with it). If we say that under a certain interpretation - here it
> > is, printed out on paper - the system is implementing a conscious computation, it would still be implementing that
> > computation if we had never determined and printed out the interpretation.
>
> The problem remains that the system's own self awareness,
> or lack thereof, is not observer-relative. something has to give.

Self-awareness is observer-relative with the observer being oneself. Where is the difficulty?

Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Wed Sep 06 2006 - 05:31:30 PDT

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