Re: computationalism and supervenience

From: 1Z <>
Date: Tue, 05 Sep 2006 11:49:14 -0700

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> On 9/5/06, 1Z <> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > Under one mapping, the physical system implements a program which thinks, "I am now experiencing my first second of life". Under a different mapping, it implements a program which thinks, "I am now experiencing my second second of life".
> >
> > And who is doing all the interpreting ?
> >
> *If* consciousness is computation and a computation is the total
> system which is composed of the program/algorithm and the interpreter
> then it means that the consciousness exist only when interpreted and
> in this case (which is you + the manual + your interpretation of the
> computation with the help of the manual) means it exist only when you
> are in fact interpreting it.

That is the answer Stathis wants, but it doesn't work. Whether a
is self-interpreting or not is itself a matter of interpretation, given
his premises.
He seems to need some sort of interpretation-independently
self-interpreting system
to start the ball rolling (= a Prime Mover).

> I think this view is wrong and the interpretation (as also
> instantiation) is a relative notion and as such the interpreting
> process does not need to be a concrete one.

Huh ? Surely everything needs to be concrete.

> In the case of a conscious
> computation (*if* consciousness is a computation) then it didn't need
> to be interpreted in the first place nor by you or any manual to be.

Well, yes, that is by far the most intuitive answer. But to be
consistent you have to take the view that no other computation
is mind-dependent.

> To answer your question of "is it existing like I'm existing ?", I'd
> say for the point of view of the conscious computation, she is as real
> as you... from your point of you it is like it is not existing and
> vice-versa...

Huh ?

> Quentin

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Received on Tue Sep 05 2006 - 14:52:00 PDT

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