Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> [Stathis Papaioannou]
> > > > If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent to the situation where every
> > > > computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists implemented on some computer or
> > > > brain in a material multiverse. This gives rise to the issues of quantum immortality and the white rabbit
> > > > problem, as discussed at great length in the past on this list.
> > > >
> > > > One way to discredit all this foolishness is to abandon computationalism...
>
> [Brent Meeker]
> > > I don't see how assuming consciousness is non-computational solves any of these
> > > conundrums about every object implementing every possible computation.
>
> > It would mean that every object implementing every possible computation
> > doesn't
> > imply that every object is conscious. Of course, one can also deny
> > that conclusion be regading computation as structural rather than
> > semantic.
>
> You don't have to go as far as saying that *computation* is structural rather than semantic. You only need to say
> that *consciousness* is structural, and hence non-computational. That's what some cognitive scientists have done,
> eg. Penrose, Searle, Maudlin. Personally, I don't see why there is such a disdain for the idea that every computation
> is implemented, including every conscious computation. The idea is still consistent with all the empirical facts, since
> we can only interact with a special subset of computations, implemented on conventional computers and brains.
Occam's razor, It is an unncessary complication.
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Received on Tue Sep 05 2006 - 09:43:48 PDT