Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >> Russell Standish writes:
> >>
> >>
> >>> On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious is
> >>>> assumed to be preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could have
> >>>> acted differently even with identical environmental inputs, which is what
> >>>> the feeling of "free will" is. However, it is possible that I might *not*
> >>>> have been able to act differently: simply feeling that I could have done so
> >>>> is not evidence that it is the case. And even if it were the case, due to
> >>>> true quantum randomness or the proliferation of branches in the multiverse
> >>>> leading to the effect of first person indeterminacy, it does not follow that
> >>>> this is necessary for consciousness to occur.
> >>>
> >>> It is true that Maudlin's argument depends on the absurdity of a recording
> >>> being conscious. If you can accept a recording as being conscious, then you
> >>> would have trouble in accepting the conclusion that counterfactuals are
> >>> relevant.
> >>
> >> That's what I'm disputing. You can have a machine handling counterfactuals, like
> >> a thermostat, that aren't conscious (not much, anyway), and machines not
> >> handling counterfactuals, like a complex computer or human with rigidly
> >> constrained inputs, that is conscious.
> >
> >
> > Computer always have counterfactuals, because there changing one part of them
> > (whether data or programme) has an effect on the overall behaviour. Changing one
> > part of a recording (e.g splicing a film) changes only *that* part.
>
> But a branch in a program need not change very much.
Chainging one bit of a programme can change everything.
> It seems that now you are
> introducing a new critereon, a degree of "counterfactualness" required for consciousness.
Movies how no counterfactualness and are therefore not
(implementationsof ) programmes.
we can say that without knowing how much counterfactualness
*is* required for consciousness.
> Brent Meeker
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Thu Aug 31 2006 - 08:07:29 PDT