RE: computationalism and supervenience

From: Stathis Papaioannou <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2006 21:43:36 +1000

Peter Jones writes:

[quoting Quentin Anciaux]
> > I didn't claim that, I simply asked more explanation on the following answer
> > you give to Stathis:
> >
> > Stathis: "For example, the version of me alive
> > in the multiverse branches where he has won the lottery every week for a year
> > has much lower measure, but he is not proportionately less conscious."
> >
> > Peter: "Then you have a WR problem. Barbour introduces the idea
> > that low-measure Nows are less conscious in order to
> > avoid the WR problem, and with no other motivation."
> >
> > As I understand your answer you seem to imply that you agree that the Stathis
> > version who has won the lottery every week for a year has much lower measure
> > and by quoting Barbour ideas of low measure "now"/OM are less conscious to
> > avoid white rabbit problem
>
> No I don't.
>
> I think Stathis's theory is wrong because his
> winning the lottery would subjectively be 50:50.

Where does that come from? If my chance of winning the lottery in any one week is
1/million (roughly correct for the first prize in many state lotteries) then my chance
of winning it every week for a year is 1/million^52, a very small probability indeed. In
the MWI I am this lucky in 1/million^52 branches, which gives the same expectation of
winning as in a single world scenario. But my original point was that this very lucky
version of me would be just as conscious as the more numerous or more likely poorer
versions: actual or potential counterfactual branches have no effect on the *actual
experience* of consciousness, even if by probability theory they have an effect on
the content of our conscious experience.

Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Wed Aug 30 2006 - 07:45:28 PDT

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