>
> (a) I know I'm conscious
> (b) I know that you are intelligent, unless my senses are tricking me
(c) I assume that you are conscious but I don't know this, even if I can
be sure
> my senses are not tricking me, in the same way as I know (a) and (b).
>
> To give another example, we know that many animals are intelligent from
observing their behaviour, but there is often speculation as to whether
they
> are conscious and what their conscious experience might be like, even
though
> we might understand and be able to predict their behaviour at least as
well as
> the behaviour of fellow humans.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
As Bertrand Russel said... something like... "everyone quotes the
solipsism argument, but nobody actually believes it".
None of a), b), c) matters. It's a completely specious misdirection
premised on the existence of an objective view which does not actually
exist. Discipline blindness at work again.
That objective view is a mutually calibrated fictional device that enables
multiple consciousnesses to cooperate to construct depictions of
regularity that _any_ consciousness of the same type will be able to use
to predict the contents of consciousness (how something appears).
There are 2 sorts of truth here:
a) The belief in a fictional 'objective view'. This is a view that is
never had by anyone.
b) The reality of a subjective view. This is a view I know I have. The
invisibility of it to any other person is simply a situational
invisibility. I get it because I am me.
This reality (b) is far more cogent than the objective view (a). At lease
ONE person really gets (b). NOBODY gets to see (a).... scientists simply
all get to act as if they did. Works great! But that's it.
The solipsism argument contributes a sytemic delusion about the nature of
evidence and we don't need it.
>I assume that you are conscious but I don't know this
This assumes that "knowing" another person is conscious purely involves
the use of phenomenal contents! The existence of any phenomenal contents
at all proves that something generates them. Process X makes them in your
head. Then you look (phenomenal contents) at the same process X in another
head....then is it more or less reasonable to
(a) posit the lack of existence of phenomenal contents in the other head
is logically impossible or at least extremely unlikely given that every
other indication is in support of the hypothesis that the other person has
phenomenal content.
or
(b) posit that I can never 'know' because I can't 'see' what the other guy
sees and then use that as an excuse to deny all scientific considerations
of underlying causal mechanism?...which in effect declares the study of
consciousness as 'unscientific' because you can't 'see it', when in fact
all scientific 'objects' are never actually 'seen' (within an objective
view) at all.
We scientists are not being consistent.
The existence of phenomenality at all in your own head is the start,
middle and end of the story of knowing _anything_. A belief in an
non-existent objective view changes nothing of this circumstance and
should never be used to assert a belief about the nature and scope of
scientific evidence.... Believe in OBJECTIVITY... that is a real
behaviour.
Do you see how this mess works? We're using a non-existent view to define
what a view is!
Everyone blurts out the same set of tired old delusions. When you analyse
them they're a specious cultural mirage.
Colin Hales
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Sun Aug 27 2006 - 03:05:55 PDT