James wrote:
>I fail to see how the format of the inputs, eg ASCII, has any bearing on the
>discussion. I have an optical system than converts data such as colours into
>electrical signals, like a keyboard converts ascii characters into
>electrical signals and a monitor convert them back.
>
>I was built by chance and necessity, which created a highly-compressed HLUT
>as an evolutionary tool.
>
>Clearly this is a major philosophical difference we have. I think that those
>on my & Hans's (and Dennett's) side of the fence will have more luck
>progressing discussions of consciousness, and building conscious machines,
>than those on the other side.
A human being is at least a universal turing machine.
So the UD* belongs completely in any HLUT build from a human being.
Of course the reciprocal is true.
Now is UD* conscious ? Altough all conscious experiences (qualia) appears
in the UD*,
I don't see any reason to attribute it consciousness, nor do I see
reasons not
to attribute it consciousness (unlike the teddy bear).
The HLUT is also an actual infinite object, so that is beyond comp.
A finite part of the HLUT is just not counterfactually correct, so it
does not
implement a computation, so, with comp, it is not natural to attribute it
consciousness.
About the consciousness problem (alias the mind-body problem)
I am on the side of Jacques Mallah (who is aware of the need of a theory
of mind) and Wei dai who is aware that the question "does X have a
subjective
experience" could have a definite objective truth status independently of
the
(in)ability of any external observer to know that truth.
(see
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/index.html?mID=861):
>[...] I don't think the subjective experience of an observer is
>necessarily open to interpretation. We don't know what it feels like to be
>someone else, but that doesn't mean there is no matter of fact about what
>it feels like to be that person. [Wei Dai].
I think Hans makes a big category mistake.
Consciousness is subjective (OK). Attribution of consciousness is
subjective (OK). It does not follow from that that you cannot be wrong
when attributing consciousness or not. The laws of subjectivity can be
objective.
By attributing consciousness to the Teddy Bear, the whole subtil point of
Maudlin's
refutation of comp disappears completely.
Bruno
Received on Tue Aug 03 1999 - 03:48:38 PDT