Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 23-août-06, à 14:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 04:15:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>> Physical supervenience is not equivalent to assuming a concrete
> >>> primitive material world. The latter is an additional assumption.
> >>
> >>
> >> This depends entirely of what you mean by physical. If
> >> "physical-supervenience" alludes to the comp-physics, then ok. If this
> >> alludes to physics as understood by a aristotelian-matter physicist,
> >> then physical supervenience need it.
> >> Maudlin talk only about supervenience. For him it is just obvious that
> >> comp makes it physical. Of course he is wrong there (or UDA contains
> >> an
> >> error, but this remains to be shown).
> >> I have coined the term "physical supervenience", with "physical"
> >> having
> >> its standard aristotelian sense just to distinguish it with the
> >> comp-supervenience idea that mind relies on the immaterial
> >> computations
> >> (an infinity of them to be precise).
> >>
> >>
> >> Bruno
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >>
> >
> >
> > Then this probably explains the confusion. Supervenience is merely
> > the statement that the physical tokens of a consciousness cannot be
> > identical for two different consciousnesses. The is independent of
> > whether those "physical tokens" are "stuffy" or not - remember I have
> > already bought your reversal of physical and mental explanations.
>
>
> Thanks for acknowledging.
>
>
> >
> > Since you have already used "physical" to refer to this appearance of
> > an objective universe, I merely thought you meant this classical
> > supervenience when contraposed against computational supervenience.
>
>
> I should perhaps use more systematically the expression "comp-physical".
>
>
>
>
> > My point is that this classical supervenience is another way of
> > stating the anthropic principle, and it is essential to avoid the
> > whole idealist programme spiralling down the plughole of solipsism.
> >
> > So what your really saying when you've shown COMP => - PHYS SUP is
> > that stuffy materialism is contradicted??
>
>
> Not really contradicted. Only that stuffy materialism cannot attach the
> first person to material stuff.
Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate. If it
were impossible to attach a class of properties to a substrate,
that would constitute a property of the substrate, and so it would not
be bare
> The notion of stuff loose its ability
> to explain the behavior of matter (which emerges from a measure on an
> infinity of computations). It does not loose its ability to explain
> mind because, well, it has never succeed on that question to begin
> with.
Bare substrate is compatible with qualia. Nothing-but-numbers is not.
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Received on Thu Aug 24 2006 - 20:33:25 PDT