RE: computationalism and supervenience

From: Stathis Papaioannou <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2006 21:04:26 +1000

Russell Standish writes:

> Its a fair point, given that we can't exactly define consciousness,
> but doesn't it seem a tad unlikely to you?
>
> The point is that in a Multiverse our own consciousnesses are not
> equivalent to recordings is suggestive, but not conclusive, that
> recordings aren't conscious.

Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or notice
that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the parallel branches
in the multiverse suddenly vanished?
 
> The Maudlin/movie-graph argument relies upon the equivalence *in fact*
> of recordings and computations in a single universe. Hence the focus
> on *counter fact*.

These arguments seem to take it as axiomatic that consciousness requires the
handling of counterfactuals. Perhaps the origin of this idea is the reasonable
observation that intelligent entities worthy of the name must be able to adjust
to changes in the environment. However, the effect of intelligent beings who
interact in surprising ways with their environment could be created by a sufficiently
complex computer program or model universe, like a cellular automaton, with fixed
rules + initial conditions, playing out the same way however many times it was run.
Maybe this isn't the type of world we actually live in, but the evidence for that
comes from eg. quantum physics experiments, not from the fact that we experience
consciousness and believe we have free will.
 
> Cheers
>
> BTW - I'm travelling to Melbourne next Wednesday on business - I'm not sure
> of my schedule yet, but maybe there's a chance of getting a coffee
> together if you're around and handy to the CBD.

Possibly around lunchtime, let me know.

Stathis Papaioannou

> On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 09:13:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > Various people write:
> >
> > > blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah
> >
> > But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in
> > a recording at the moment? True, I am surprised by my experiences
> > and believe I could have acted differently had I wanted to, but that
> > might all be part of the script to which I am not privy, so that things
> > could only have been different if the recording had been different.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Thu Aug 24 2006 - 07:06:17 PDT

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