RE: Implementation

From: Gilles HENRI <Gilles.Henri.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 1999 17:17:51 +0200

>The point I made earlier, 'I am a HLUT' - and it may have seemed facetious -
>is that we are, in fact, HLUTs. You draw your 'inside' and 'outsied'
>boundary as you wish (it's all arbitrary), then look something up by
>stimulating the inside (brain,HLUT, whatever) with a request. You get an
>answer, returned by the HLUT. The fact that it is a mass of competing
>neurones, with molecular-level interactions, not a nice silicone-based
>database, is irrelevant. The fact that part of the 'stimulus' is given by
>'internal' factors such as levels of dopamine, is irrelevant.
>
>You can view the neurones as a compressed version of the HLUT database. If
>you gave me a HLUT to compress and sufficient resources, I might end up
>giving you a wet brain.
>
>Any system will return certain responses to certain stimulii. You are
>arguing that the form somehow determines the function of the system.
>
>Your denial of Hans's points necessitates that there are certain internal
>functions of the conscious entity which CANNOT be viewed as outputs, such as
>dreams. So the onus is on you to prove that dreams cannot be viewed as
>outputs.
>
>I won't bother refuting Gilles's final point, that the HLUT is 'too big'
>to be conscious. Anyway, why should the HLUT be bigger than a brain? There
>is a helluvalot of information stored in the configuration of a human brain
>- quark by quark. A brain may be the most efficient rendering of a HLUT.
>
>I wish I had more time to refute these daft anthromorphocentric reactions to
>the HLUT's valid claim to consciousness. But I don't.
>
>James

I need details on the way HLUT is working. How do you HLUT answer the
question: "What is the color of your shirt?"
and this other question:
"What was the color of your shirt last Sunday?"

Gilles
Received on Mon Aug 02 1999 - 08:14:43 PDT