Re: computationalism and supervenience

From: Russell Standish <>
Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2006 23:10:03 +1000

Its a fair point, given that we can't exactly define consciousness,
but doesn't it seem a tad unlikely to you?

The point is that in a Multiverse our own consciousnesses are not
equivalent to recordings is suggestive, but not conclusive, that
recordings aren't conscious.

The Maudlin/movie-graph argument relies upon the equivalence *in fact*
of recordings and computations in a single universe. Hence the focus
on *counter fact*.


BTW - I'm travelling to Melbourne next Wednesday on business - I'm not sure
of my schedule yet, but maybe there's a chance of getting a coffee
together if you're around and handy to the CBD.

On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 09:13:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Various people write:
> > blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah
> But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in
> a recording at the moment? True, I am surprised by my experiences
> and believe I could have acted differently had I wanted to, but that
> might all be part of the script to which I am not privy, so that things
> could only have been different if the recording had been different.
> Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Wed Aug 23 2006 - 19:22:31 PDT

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