Re: computationalism and supervenience

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2006 11:50:07 +0200

Le 21-août-06, à 20:28, Russell Standish a écrit :

>
> On Tue, Aug 22, 2006 at 01:32:14PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> Bruno Marchal writes:
>>
>>>> The other sticking point is, given computationalism
>>>> is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have
>>>> been arguments
>>>> that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam,
>>>> Searle, Moravec)
>>>> and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows
>>> (like
>>> me) that we have:
>>>
>>> NOT COMP or NOT PHYSICAL SUPERVENIENCE
>>
>> That sentence summarises the problem pretty well. We have to agree
>> that there is this dichotomy before proceeding further, and I don't
>> think most computationalists do.
>>
>
> To be sure, this is not how I interpret Maudlin or the movie-graph
> argument. I interpret it as NOT COMP or NOT PHYS SUP or NOT
> SINGLE_UNIVERSE.
>
> In a multiple universe (eg Everett style MWI), all counterfactuals are
> instantiated as well, so physical supervenience (over all branches) is
> compatible to COMP, and not equivalent to a recording.




This is a very interesting remark, although I am not convinced. I have
also believed for a while that a material universe could be saved by
the way the quantum multiverse actualizes the counterfactuals.
But if that were true, consciousness would not supervene on a
*classical* machine running deterministically an emulation of a
universal quantum turing itself running my brain, making comp false.
Your move could belong to what I will perhaps eventually call "the
magical use of matter for explaining (away) consciousness". That move
is subtler with respect to the movie-graph, than with respect to the
seven first step of UDA.
But I think you are correct, and it could be a pedagogical clever idea
to show first clearly that the movie graph entails (not-comp OR
not-phys-sup OR many-world), and then to show the perhaps less easy
point that the concrete primitively material many-world is a red
herring in this setting.
We should come back on this in a "the 8th step" (movie graph) thread.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Received on Tue Aug 22 2006 - 05:52:05 PDT

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