Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>> And such a universe could be emulated as a running, deterministic process. But
>> that won't get you into Plato's heaven, because it is a *running* process -- it
>> is still dynamic. A recording of the process could exist in Plato's heaven, but
>> it wouldn't have all the counterfactuals, so the computationalist is not
>> required to believe that it contains any real sentience -- the simulated beings
>> in it would have no more consciousness of their own than the characters in a
>> movie!
>>
>> Likewise, the computationalist is not required to believe that an unexecuted
>> programme is sentient (even though it has, theoretically, the counterfactuals).
>>
>> No-one would believe that a brain-scan, however detailed, is conscious, so not
>> computationalist, however ardent, is required to believe that a progamme
>> gathering udston a shelf is sentient, however good a piece of AI code it is.
>
>
> Leave aside for the moment the computer running in Platonia and consider a real
> computer. You say that a computer program is defined in part by its ability to
> handle counterfactuals, distinguishing it from a mere recording, but it is this
> distinction with which I have difficulties. The characters in a film are not
> conscious because the film only simulates external appearance, not because it
> lacks if-then statements. A film obviously does handle if-then statements, because
> if the patterns on the film are different the projection on the screen would also
> be different.
That's not a proper example though. It would imply to a rock - it would be different
if it weren't a rock. To be intelligent (much less conscious) the if-then must be
inresponse to different environmental inputs.
>A computer program basically does the same thing: it consistently
> produces a certain output for a certain input.
That's why you can't tell whether a program is intelligent by giving it a "certain
input". There must be a variety of inputs and the response will in general be
different depending on their order (smart programs have memory).
>In the MWI of QM a computer program
> or human mind may have more luxuriant branchings than a recording,
This seems to reify the branches as part of the program. They are part of the
*process of running* the program. The branches arise from different inputs.
>but that is
> just a matter of degree, and in any case there is no reason to suppose that a
> program is any less valid or less conscious because of the presence or absence of
> near-copies segregated in parallel universes. In the CI of QM it would be possible
> to introduce true randomness into a computer program but the same could be done
> for a recording, and again there is no reason to suppose that a program is any
> less valid or less conscious because it isn't random. Randomness and/or parallel
> processes are not a prerequisite for a classical computer to function.
I agree with that.
> You might say that a computer program has a two-way interaction with its
> environment while a recording does not, but it is easy to imagine a situation
> where this can be perfectly reproduced by a recording. In run no. 1, you start up
> the computer program and have a conversation with it. In run no. 2 you start up
> the computer program and play it the recording of your voice from run no. 1. As
> far as the program is aware, it receives exactly the same inputs and goes through
> exactly the same responses on both runs, but one is a recording and the other is
> not. Run no. 2 is exactly analogous to a film: a fixed input resulting in a fixed
> output, even though if the input had been different the output would also have
> been different. I don't see how you could say that the computer is conscious in
> run no. 1 but not in run no. 2.
If the program is intelligent it'll be bored by 2. :-) You seem to mixing questions
of discovering whether a program is intelligent, with what it means for it to be
intelligent.
Brent Meeker
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Mon Aug 21 2006 - 23:26:20 PDT