1Z wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>>>The other sticking point is, given computationalism
>>>is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have
>>>been arguments
>>>that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam,
>>>Searle, Moravec)
>>>and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal).
>>
>>
>>
>>OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows (like
>>me) that we have:
>>
>>NOT COMP or NOT PHYSICAL SUPERVENIENCE
>>
>>But apparently Maudlin want to keep physical supervenience, and thus
>>concludes there is a problem with comp. I keep comp, and thus I
>>conclude there is a problem with physical supervenience.
>>Actually I just abandon the thesis of the physical supervenience, to
>>replace it by a thesis of number-theoretical supervenience.
>
>
> There is a lot more evidence for physical supervenience than there is
> for
> computationalism. (There are no fully succesful human-type AI's, for
> instance).
If there were, they'd be implemented on some hardware that interacted causally with
the environment. Although certainly not of human-type, I'd say that the Mars Rovers
and similar probes realize considerable AI.
Brent Meeker
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Mon Aug 21 2006 - 17:34:37 PDT