Slight correction:
If you are sane then you're not sure that you are sane, then you would
have to be crazy to say "Yes Doctor."......
...................yet a man could say it but not a "sane" machine.
Bruno's quest based on machine psychology runs the risk of leaving
unanswered the really big quest based on human psychology.
George
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>Le 21-août-06, à 07:11, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
>
>>It seems to me that there are two main sticking points in the
>>discussions on
>>several list threads in recent weeks. One is computationalism: is it
>>right or wrong?
>>This at least is straightforward in that it comes down to a question
>>of faith, in the
>>final analysis, as to whether you would accept a digital replacement
>>brain or not
>>(Bruno's "yes doctor" choice).
>>
>>
>
>Yes. Unfortunately this gives not a purely operational definition of
>comp.
>Someone could say yes to the doctor, just thinking that God exists, and
>that God is infinitely Good so that he will manage to resuscitate him
>through the reconstitution (he believes also God is infinitely
>powerful).
>So comp is really the belief that you can survive with an artificial
>brain *qua computatio", that is, through the respect of some digital
>relation only.
>
>
>
>
>
>>The other sticking point is, given computationalism
>>is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have
>>been arguments
>>that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam,
>>Searle, Moravec)
>>and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal).
>>
>>
>
>
>
>OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows (like
>me) that we have:
>
>NOT COMP or NOT PHYSICAL SUPERVENIENCE
>
>But apparently Maudlin want to keep physical supervenience, and thus
>concludes there is a problem with comp. I keep comp, and thus I
>conclude there is a problem with physical supervenience.
>Actually I just abandon the thesis of the physical supervenience, to
>replace it by a thesis of number-theoretical supervenience.
>
>
>
>
>>The discussion about Platonism
>>and the ontological status of mathematical structures, in particular,
>>relates to this
>>second issue. Bruno alludes to it in several papers and posts, and
>>also alludes to his
>>"movie graph argument", but as far as I can tell that argument in its
>>entirety is only
>>available in French.
>>
>>
>
>
>That's true. I should do something about that. I don't feel it is so
>urgent in the list because there are more simple problem to tackle
>before, and also, most "MWI", or "Everything"-people can easily imagine
>the UD doesn't need to be run. But this is a subtle problem for those
>who have faith in their uniqueness or in the uniqueness of the world.
>Still you are right, I should write an english version of the movie
>graph.
>
>Bruno
>
>
>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Mon Aug 21 2006 - 16:03:39 PDT