1Z wrote:
> Hmm. I think the substrate is just down to Somethingism -- some
> possible things
> exist, other don't.
Yes, but I find that to avoid slipping implicitly into 'relations
without the relata', or necessarily relying on 'matter', it's
conceptually helpful to have a 'figure/ ground' sort of schema, and the
'ground' is what I'm here calling the 'substrate'. Within this, some
'things' - occasions of relatedness - will exist, others won't.
>
> So: even if I don't know in which sense i exsit, I exist
> in some sense S, and if numbers don't exist in (at least)
> sense S (whatever that is) , I cannot be one.
>
> Therefore, there must be some kind of existence-claim
> in Bruno's thesis.
Yes, sorry - language again. I meant 'reflexive' precisely in the sense
that S must be the same for both - i.e. the senses must 'reflect' each
other even where they're not specified in detail. So of course I agree
that Bruno's view implies an existence claim (though I know he
doesn't).
> I am not at all sure that "views" equate to kinds of existstence.
>
> I just think that arguments cannot come to sound existential
> conclusions
> without making existential assumptions..
OK. And the sound existential conclusion, and the assumptions on which
it is based, will must be adequate to account for both of these views,
yes?
> The bare substrate, AFAICS, is inferred empricially,
> although having been inferred, it can then explain various
> basic facts logically (through its very bareness!)
When you say 'empirically' do you mean for example that there might
have been no opportunity for us to infer anything, or that something
quite other might have been the case to be inferred? I suppose when you
appeal to 'brute facts', that necessarily implies that the facts might
be brutally otherwise. But do you hold that there are any logically or
conceptually prior constraints on what could be available to be brutely
discovered, or is this simply an open question?
> I am not convinced that ther is anything special about
> my existence objectively, it is just a convenient starting-point
> (epistemologcially).
> It might turn out to be inessential (ontologically).
Well, your factual existence may be circumstantially contingent,
although necessarily potential in the overall state of affairs, given
your factual existence. So, 'inessential' in what sense?
> I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are
> neceesarily
> the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue
> that
> that they are the only things that exist necessarily..)
But aren't they claiming that numbers are the only things necessary
(together with the operations required for CT+YD, whatever they might
be) to account for *our* existence? If not, what else is required?
> The point of that particular formulation is to avoid giving an exact
> meaning --
> although I the meaning of existence in the
> emprical-contingent-materialist
> snese can be explained.
So in that case is empirical evidence to convince us one way or the
other only to the extent that we are willing to build 'empiricism' into
our presuppositions about reality? IOW, are all justifications destined
to be entirely circular?
David
> David Nyman wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> >
> > > > This isn't a surprise surely, because 'matter' is defined purely
> > > > relationally as behaviour.
> > >
> > > By whom ?
> >
> > Not by me! I mean that I assume that it is defined this way in the
> > 'AR+CT+YD' version of comp. Whereas I need a 'substrate' to carry my
> > sense of reflexive ontic 'realism' or 'seriousness'. I think our views
> > can be reconciled (see below).
>
> Hmm. I think the substrate is just down to Somethingism -- some
> possible things
> exist, other don't.
>
> > > >I just can't
> > > > see, except in 'as if' mode, how AR truly serves as 'ontic ground zero'
> > > > in this 'maximally serious' sense.
> > >
> > > Some of us think matter does...
> >
> > And as it happens we both may be included in this 'some of us'! I've
> > been reading with interest your exchange with Bruno re the 'existence'
> > of numbers etc - also what you've been saying to Stathis about the
> > significance of instantiation and the consequent difference between
> > 'programme and process'. I've always felt that that much of our
> > disagreement was language based, and reading these conversations has
> > reinforced this. When you say:
> >
> > > If numbers don't exist in the sense that I exist, then I cannot be a number.
> >
> > I'm perfectly happy to agree. And 'in the sense that I exist' is what
> > I always intended by 'personal', etc. Consequently, as far as I'm
> > concerned, we can agree on 'reflexive necessity' as ontic ground zero.
>
> Actually, you have lost me there.
>
> The point I was trying to make was that I don't have to define
> exactly what my existence is. (Bruno's rationalism makes
> him think no question can can be settled unless it can be exactly
> defined; my empiricism makes me believe there are Brute
> Facts which are true even if we don't understand their nature).
>
> So: even if I don't know in which sense i exsit, I exist
> in some sense S, and if numbers don't exist in (at least)
> sense S (whatever that is) , I cannot be one.
>
> Therefore, there must be some kind of existence-claim
> in Bruno's thesis.
>
> > IOW, we both ask that whatever is postulated as the fons et origo of
> > existence should exist 'in the sense that I exist'. I think the
> > difference in language is mainly that my mental picture begins with the
> > 'situated view' and yours with the 'external view', but I think we both
> > believe that a 'serious' view of 'existence' cannot dispense with
> > either, and must reconcile and unify them.
>
> I am not at all sure that "views" equate to kinds of existstence.
>
> I just think that arguments cannot come to sound existential
> conclusions
> without making existential assumptions..
>
> > Hence the idea of a 'bare
> > substrate' as indispensible to carry this basic sense of existence,
> > within which relationally defined 'properties' and 'phenomena' can then
> > coherently find their expression.
>
> The bare substrate, AFAICS, is inferred empricially,
> although having been inferred, it can then explain various
> basic facts logically (through its very bareness!)
>
> > But it seems to me that inherent in Bruno's (and Stathis') view is a
> > desire to have relationality without the relata, and although this may
> > lead to some unexpected epistemological insights, it leads IMO to a
> > fatally incoherent theory of 'existence', with a concomittant
> > trivialisation, amounting to dismissal, of the whole notion of
> > instantiation.
>
> I agree. They seem to found their arguments on an inability
> to understand the difference between truth and existence.
>
>
> > There is a fundamental disagreement here on the mutual
> > dependency of 'personal existence' and 'conceptual existence'. I hold,
> > and I think you do too, that 'I exist' must be prior to 'concepts
> > exist', whereas AR+CT+YD holds the opposite.
>
> I am not convinced that ther is anything special about
> my existence objectively, it is just a convenient starting-point
> (epistemologcially).
> It might turn out to be inessential (ontologically).
>
> > So its article of faith
> > becomes:
> >
> > 'If I don't exist in the sense that numbers exist, then I cannot be.'
>
> I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are
> neceesarily
> the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue
> that
> that they are the only things that exist necessarily..)
>
> Bruno sometimes claims that the posit of material existence is
> unnecessary once you have immaterial existence..and also
> that material existence is not merely unnecessary but impossible.
>
> > Actually, your recent debates on these issues have come as close as
> > I've seen on the list to pinning down the precise terms of disagreement
> > between what amounts two two camps. It would be a great service to the
> > list if we could achieve a position where the 'articles of faith' of
> > each camp could be unambiguously defined, even if not reconciled. For a
> > start, have you a view on the status, as empirical *evidence* for your
> > position, of what you intend by 'the sense I exist'?
>
> The point of that particular formulation is to avoid giving an exact
> meaning --
> although I the meaning of existence in the
> emprical-contingent-materialist
> snese can be explained.
>
> > I ask because both
> > sides claim the 'sense of existence' as compatible with their views,
> > and it would be really helpful if this could be shown to be false.
> >
> > David
> >
> > > David Nyman wrote:
> > >
> > > > This isn't a surprise surely, because 'matter' is defined purely
> > > > relationally as behaviour.
> > >
> > > By whom ?
> > >
> > > >I just can't
> > > > see, except in 'as if' mode, how AR truly serves as 'ontic ground zero'
> > > > in this 'maximally serious' sense.
> > >
> > > Some of us think matter does...
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Received on Mon Aug 21 2006 - 12:57:47 PDT