Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

From: 1Z <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2006 14:23:59 -0000

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> > If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
>
>
> I can hardly not agree with that.
>
>
> >
> > If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
> > how a strucuture like a physial world would emerge from
> > a UD if a UD existed does not explain my *existence* --
> > then something else does, such as matter.
>
>
> 1) I don't think think so at all. Even if numbers cannot explain your
> existence, it does not follows that matter can explain it, nor God, nor
> anything else a priori.

Matter has been a succesful explanation for many centuries -- an
aposteriori explanation. Who said that only apriori explanations are
acceptable ?
Is that the premiss underlying your other premisses ?


> Actually, assuming the comp hyp., the UDA shows
> precisely why a notion of primitive matter cannot explain the mind.

Matter can explain anything computationalism or
mathematics can explain, since any computaiotnal
or mathematical structurecan be implmented in matter.

It can also provide support for time and qulia, and
explain away HP universes.

> 2) Numbers, and the UD, by existing just in the usual sense of realist
> mathematicians (like in statements similar to "it exists a perfect
> number") explains completely your (correct, non illusory) *feeling*
> of existence, including both the sharable part of it (quanta) and the
> unsharable part of it (the qualia).

Only if the "usual sense of realist mathematicians" is
a sense amouting to the kind of existence I actually
have (even if I mistakenly think that is material existence,
I still have ot exist in some sense in order to make the mistake!).

But that is what I have been saying all along. The argumentative
work is being done by the hidden assumption of Platonism,
not the explicit assumption of computationalism.

> 3) ... and all this in a testable way, given that comp makes precise
> predictions.
>
> Let me simplify to be clearer. The TOE has made progress:
>
>
> 1) Copenhagen TOE:
>
> -Numbers
> -Wave equation
> -Unintelligible mind theory (collapse)
>
>
>
> 2) Everett TOE:
>
> -Wave equation

Everett is compatible with standard computationalism.
It doesn't have to assume computationalism. Any non-magical
theory of mind will do.

> -Comp
>
> 3) your servitor:
>
> -Comp

Not just computationalism, because you need to
assume a UD exists

a) " just in the usual sense of realist mathematicians"
[ a "realist mathematician" being a Platonist .. ]

b) in some way real enough for me to be part of its output.

Computationalsim is a thesis about minds, not about maths...

> All what I say is that if comp is true, then
>
> 1) by UDA, we have to derive the wave equation (UDA explains why we
> have to)
> 2) by the arithmetical UDA, we know at least one way how to retrieve
> it (by the interview of a UTM)
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Received on Mon Aug 21 2006 - 10:25:53 PDT

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