Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > >
> > > > > Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic, non-branching
> > > > > computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in general
> > > > > being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program will play
> > > > > out?
> > > >
> > > > Lots of things are possible. The question is what to believe.
> > >
> > > True, but I thought you were saying that such a thing was incompatible with consciousness,
> > > and I see no reason to believe that.
> >
> > There are a lot of prolems with what you are saying.
> >
> > I don't think it is possible to get dynamism out of stasis,
> > and I don't think it is possible to get qualia out of mathematical
> > structues
>
> But what about a physical computer which creates an entire virtual environment, complete
> with sentient beings? Once started up it would be completely deterministic, just as a recording
> would be. It could have if-then statements but these would not make any difference, given initial
> conditions.
> (A recording also has if-then statements, in that if the input were different, the
> output would also be different.)
> This could as easily be a real model of a classical universe, with
> no interference from outside once initial conditions + laws of physics had been set. The if-then
> statements are implicit in the laws of physics: if I throw a rock, it will follow a parabolic trajectory
> and shatter the window.
Yes, that is my point. Computationalsim requires
processes that implement algorithms, algorithms require
counterfactuals, counterfactuals are underpinned by
physical causality.
But all you can have in Plato's heaven is a recording that
doesn't have counterfactual behaviour, or a programme (as opposed
to a process) that isn't implemented.
> As an inhabitant of the univerese I think I have free will in deciding whether
> or not to throw the rock, but in fact this is no more indeterminate than the workings of a clockwork
> mechanism.
Assuming the universe is detrerministic. (Actually,
classical physics isn't computable...)
> My understanding is that standard computationalism allows for consciousness to occur
> in such a universe, even if it isn't the universe we actually live in.
And such a universe could be emulated
as a running, deterministic process. But
that won't get you into Plato's heaven,
because it is a *running* process -- it is still
dynamic. A recording of the process could
exist in Plato's heaven, but it wouldn't have
all the counterfactuals, so the computationalist
is not required to believe that it contains
any real sentience -- the simulated
beings in it would have no more
consciousness of their own than the characters in a movie!
Likewise, the computationalist is not
required
to believe that an unexecuted programme is sentient
(even though it has, theoretically, the counterfactuals).
No-one would believe that a brain-scan, however detailed,
is conscious, so not computationalist, however ardent,
is required to believe that a progamme gathering udston a shelf
is sentient, however good a piece of AI code it is.
>If not, then you have to abandon
> computationalism and embrace something like Penrose's theory in which essentially non-computable
> quantum effects are responsible for consciousness; or maybe we've just all been issued with a soul
> by God.
Standard computationalism refers to real, physical processes
running on material computers. You have to show
that the causality and dynamism are inessential
(that there is no relevant difference between process and programme)
before you can have consciousness implemented Platonically.
(No *special* kind of physics is required).
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
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Received on Mon Aug 21 2006 - 08:51:50 PDT