Le 19-août-06, à 15:36, Günther wrote:
>> The existence of numbers is not like the existence of objects, and I
>> don't
>> think that most mathematical Platonists would say that it is.
I agree with them. We have to distinguish many forms of "internal" or
epistemological existence, build from the simplest conceptual third
person ontological commitments.
Comp necessitates the numbers for the "ontic" part, and the rest
emerges as coherent overlapping set of of computations (quotientized
through some undistinguishability first person equivalence relation).
To be short.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Sun Aug 20 2006 - 07:46:33 PDT