RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

From: Stathis Papaioannou <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 19 Aug 2006 15:00:37 +1000

Brent Meeker writes:
 
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> ...
> >>I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
> >>must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
> >
> >
> > I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain
> > if-then statements.
> >
> >
> >>other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing
> >>any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case,
> >>Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to
> >>a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is
> >>conscious and the other not.
> >
> >
> > If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically
> > identical.
>
> I don't think I understand this either. Computer programs contain if-then
> statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the program.
> But there is no real distinction between data an program. So if you insist
> that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in the
> program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is
> implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an
> environment.
>
> I'm sympathetic to this view. I think intelligence is relative to an
> environment. But I'm not sure what computationalists think of this; I believe
> they suppose the environment can be simulated too and so then the whole thing is
> a closed system and there are no conuterfactual branchings.
>
> Brent Meeker

Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic, non-branching
computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in general
being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program will play
out?

Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Sat Aug 19 2006 - 01:02:38 PDT

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