Le 13-août-06, à 19:17, Rich Winkel a écrit :
>
> According to Stathis Papaioannou:
>> The best we can do in science as in everyday life is to accept
>> provisionally that things are as they seem. There is no shame in
>> this, as long as you are ready to revise your theory in the light
>> of new evidence, and it is certainly better than assuming that
>> things are *not* as they seem, in the absence of any evidence.
>
> The process isn't quite that benign, especially when applied to
> one's treatment of others. There will always be unknowable truths,
> one should proceed with an acute sense of one's own ignorance. Yet
> with each advance in science people and their institutions act
> increasingly recklessly with regard to unanticipated consquences.
>
> How can we perceive and measure our own ignorance?
One way is the following: assume that you are a digitalizable machine,
and then study the intrinsical ignorance of the digitalizable machine,
which can be done (through computer science).
Here I tend to agree with Rich Winkel contra Stathis Papaioannou. To
accept, even provisionally, that things are as they seem, is akin to
trust "nature" about the genuiness of the work of our brain with
respect to some local reality. Then indeed we can revise our theories
in case they are wrong. But we can also assume some hypothesis about
the "observer", and realize that in some case things just cannot be as
they seem. I mean we can find *reasons* why Being take a departure from
Seeming, especially concerning a global view for which our brain could
"naturally" be deficient.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Tue Aug 15 2006 - 07:06:27 PDT