>
> Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>:
> > I don't think we ever discussed the concept of attributing
> > consciousness to inanimate objects before Hans came along.
>
> But I think you DID agree to attribute consciousness to
> purely abstract entities, notably mathematically defined
> universes containing SASes.
Correct. This is the definition of SAS. That we don't yet have a
reasonable definition of either SAS or consciousness is not a cause of
concern. It just means there is more work to be done.
>
> I merely pointed out that it is possible, even natural
> and common, to map such abstractions containing
> self-aware systems onto many things we commonly encounter.
>
Anthropomorphism may be common, but this doesn't mean it is correct,
nor useful.
> This violates some reflexive assumptions you carry, many
> instilled by a western education.
> Those assumptions badly need to be violated.
>
> They may have been good during our recent naive materialist
> phase of development, but that phase is ending.
> This list's discussion topic is one symptom of that end, as
> are looming questions about conscious machines.
>
> Other traditions have no problem seeing minds in
> inanimate objects, when such interpretation facilitates
> interaction. That acceptance has much to do with the
> Japanese comfortable acceptance of robots.
>
> Western stinginess in attributing minds, on the other
> hand, is becoming a Luddite-rousing impediment to progress.
>
How so?
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Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Wed Jul 28 1999 - 20:15:40 PDT