Le 10-août-06, à 22:44, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>
> With the materialist hypothesis there is also no dualism.
This is defensible but necessitates a solution of the mind-body
problem, to explain the relation between sensations and "matter".
The traditional implicit or explicit solution of the materialist is
comp.
And then I show it does not work. Even the traditional comp or standard
comp (as you call it) makes "matter" epistemologically devoid of any
explicative power (cf the UDA).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Mon Aug 14 2006 - 09:00:03 PDT