Re: Are First Person prime?

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2006 11:29:26 +0200

Le 09-août-06, à 18:08, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :

> Platonia has not been instantiated. Our universe has.

The problem with such a conception is that it seems to need a form of
dualism between Plato Heaven and terrestrial realities.
With the comp hyp, all there is is (arithmetical) Platonia.
Instanciation is relative and appears from inside.

> Being the stuff, the substrate. It's the only thing actually
> instantiated.

This seems, imo, contradicts what you I remember you said somewhere
else (or I'm wrong?), mainly when you say, in a monist frame, that
everything is relational.

>>> The fact is that
> there
>>> is no such thing as a 'third person'.
>> Ontologically ?
> No, experientially.
> Nobody experiences 'third person'. Everybody has a 1st person
> experience
> only. There is no such thing as an objective view.

I think that many people confuse third person view and 0 person "view".
I will probably (try to) clarify this in the "roadmap-summary". I
agree there is no "objective *view*, but I think there is a notion of
objective reality, although such a reality is not necessarily knowable
as such.

> Furthermore it also seems to have us duped that further considerations
> of
> mathematical idealisations and abstractions in general likewise tells
> us
> something about the composition of the actual underlying natural
> world....
> for example that it is the result of a computer running one of our
> abstractions.

With comp I would say we can prove that "the composition of the
underlying world" have to emerge, NOT as the result of a computer
running one of our abstractions (like in Schmidhuber's theory for
example) but on all possible computations existing in Platonia, and
well defined through that miraculous Church's thesis. The quantum would
emerge from digitalness seen from digital entity. Physical realities
would be number theoretical realities as seen by relative numbers.


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Received on Thu Aug 10 2006 - 05:34:55 PDT

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