David Nyman wrote:
>George Levy wrote:
>
>
>
>>Thus first person perception of the world comes about when our own
>>existence is contingent on our observation.
>>
>>
>
>Hi George
>
>I think I agree with this. It could correspond with what I'm trying to
>model in terms of FP1 etc. Perhaps it might be expressed as:
>
>First person perception of the world comes about when our own
>observation and existence are mutually contingent
>
>
Not at all. A bidirectional contingency is superfluous. The only
relevent contingency is: If the observed event will result in different
probabilities of survival for myself and for others observing me, then
our perceptions will be different.
>
>
>>Third person perception comes about in situations when our own existence
>>is not contingent on our observation.
>>
>>
>
>Now here I'm not so clear.
>
>In sum, I'm not clear what sort of observation is *not* contingent on
>our existence, except someone else's observation, and so far as I can
>see this is always first person by your definition. Do you simply mean
>to define any observation not involving ourselves as 'third person'
>from our point-of-view?
>
>
>
Third person perception comes about when several observers share the
same perception because they share the same environmental contingencies
on their existence. In effect these observers share the same "frame of
reference." I see many similarities with relativity theory which I have
discussed numerous times on this list in the past. Let's be clear: all
these observer have a first person perspective, however this first
person perspective appears to be the same across observers, and
therefore appears to be *independent* of the observers. This perspective
can be called *objective* but we must keep in mind that it is the same
only because the frame of reference is the same. Thus the concept of
objectivity loses its meaning unless we raise the meaning to a higher
level and accept that different observers will predictably see different
things, just like in relativity theory different observers may
predictably make different measurements of the same object.
George
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Wed Aug 09 2006 - 00:29:28 PDT