Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

From: 1Z <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 08 Aug 2006 08:18:56 -0700

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 08-août-06, à 08:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >>
> >> Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like
> >> observing
> >> your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the "path" of an
> >> electron.
> >
> > Could you say more about this? If you examine an object more and more
> > closely you see more and more detail, and I understand that you have
> > other
> > arguments suggesting that this is all due to the ensemble of
> > computations
> > underpinning the physical reality, but are you suggesting that the
> > fact that
> > you can observe these levels is *by itself* evidence for these levels
> > and
> > sublevels of computation?
>
> Comp predicts that if you look closely enough you will see reality
> blurring. The evidence from empirical science (quantum physics) is that
> indeed reality blurs, but of course "informal comp" does not give the
> details of the blurring process.

One thing we *do* know for sure is that Harry Potter universes --
*literal* HP universes -- are computable, since the special effects
in the Harry Potter movies were computer generated!

Therefore the problem with everythingism is that it predicts *too much*
weirdness. (And, as I am forever pointing out,
materialism-contingency-empiricism [*] doesn't exclude quantum
fuzziness or many
worlds, providing there are contingent facts about how much fuzziness
and how many worlds).

[*] my term for the non-everythingist philosophy.


--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Tue Aug 08 2006 - 11:20:58 PDT

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:12 PST