# Re: Are First Person prime?

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2006 14:30:11 +0200

Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit :

> Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to
>> make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can
>> really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way.
>> Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and
>> in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for
>> knowing. That is:
>>
>> 1) If p is knowable then p is true;
>> 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable;
>> 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is
>> knowable
>>
>> (+ some logical rules).
>>
>>
>
>
> I like where this may be leading.... This may be the first step to
> your roadmap. As you know I have been a supporter of first person
> primitive for a long time. My roadmap was simple. It is a chain rule a
> la Descartes. I mentionned it before. Let me repost it:
>> 1 I think therefore I am  (Descartes)
>> 2 I am therefore the world is (Anthropic principle)
>> 3 The world is therefore the plenitude is. (Principe of sufficient
>> reason: if something is observed to be arbitrary and without any
>> cause, then all other alternatives must also be realized)

This is coherent with the theaetetical notion of comp, although you
take "Anthropic" in a very large sense (perhaps too large).

>
>> 1  I think what I think, therefore I am what I am. (Descartes
>> augmented by defining my consciousness and being as a function of my
>> thought process)
>> 2 I am what I am, therefore the world is what it is. (Anthropic
>> principle augmented by defining the world in more precise terms as a
>> function of exactly who I am - There is a strange echo from the
>> burning bush in Exodus)
>> 3 The world is what it is, therefore the plenitude is.

I am not sure this helps.

> Would it be possible to map your three axiomatic lines replacing
> "knowable" by "think" and "true" by "exist." ...

See my conversation with 1Z (Peter D. Jones). I will define "exist" by
" "exist" is true".

> Then we have:
>
>> 1 If p thinks then p exists;

This does not make sense at all, I prefer to say honestly. It is not
the proposition p which thinks, and I don't understand what would it
means that a proposition exists. I guess you are perhaps saying here
that If a Machine(entity) thinks then it exists. Then OK. But as you
know I don't believe the reverse is true. In particular I belief that
the square root of two exist (perhaps under the form of a total
computable function), but I would not say that the square root of two
thinks. I do think that the multiverse even got rich but devoid of
consciousness (immaterial) comp-branches.

>> 2 If p thinks then it is thinkable that p thinks;

All right with the interpretation that "p" is some entity, not a
proposition. Perhaps you are identifying machines and propositions?
This can be done .... with the Fi and Wi ...., and it needs many
cautions.

>> 3 If it is thinkable that p entails q, then if p thinks then q
>> thinks.
>> 1 If p thinks then p exists; (This maps nicely with Descartes as
>> stated from a third person)
>> 2 If p thinks then p think that p thinks; (This is nice reflective
>> statement essential to consciousness)
>> 3 If p think that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. (The
>> phrase "p entails q" reminds me vaguely of the Anthropic principle. I
>> am not sure what to make of this. My children think???????)

Your way of talking is a bit confusing as you seem to see by yourself
:)

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Received on Sat Aug 05 2006 - 08:32:18 PDT

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