Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2006 17:42:29 +0200

Le 02-août-06, à 10:20, C. W. a écrit :

>
> Hi, Bruno,
>
> Sorry for my na鴳e question.
> Common people would think that UDA is just imagination since you use
> the
> teleportation
> example and teleportation of human beings is still a science fiction.
> Nobody can show that the substitution level really exists and
> teleportation
> of human beings is really workable.
> I really wonder if it's OK to use teleportation as thought experiment.


All we need to *reason* for getting consequence of comp is that such
substitution is *in principle* possible. Theoreticians does that, in
many fields.
I insist that the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) is based on the
notion of generalized brain: you could say that your brain in the
entire galaxy. By comp this entails the entire galaxy is turing
emulable, then, this is enough to say the platonic UD will go through
your "generalized" brain soon or later (in term of number of steps),
and that is enough to understand that comp makes obligatory that the
laws of physics emerge from the relation existing among numbers (that +
other steps of the reasoning of course).
The impracticality of substitution is just not relevant to throw out
the theoretical consequences.
Then comp can be tested experimentally due to others consequences (like
the observable interference among many computations, etc.). OK?

Bruno

PS (I am alas again busy. Please be patient for the replies).

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Thu Aug 03 2006 - 11:49:02 PDT

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:11 PST