Re: Emotions (was: Indeterminism

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2006 14:21:13 +0200

Le 28-juil.-06, à 22:15, David Nyman a écrit :

<snip (a bit unclear sorry)>

> In your comments above you refer to Platonism. It seems clear that if
> we are to regard mathematics or comp as having the kind of 'efficacy'
> (sorry, but what word would you prefer?), then we must indeed grant
> them some sort of Platonic independent reality, as we have given up on
> the 'primitivity' of matter. I suppose in this case I would say that
> such reality is a 'present' one, which is how we find ourselves to be
> present within it.

Yes. And then the (bad ?) news is that, thanks to theoretical computer
science and some mathematical logic, this can be translated into
mathematical questions leading to difficult conjectures.

To be clear I don't follow you in case you take seriously the idea of
making first person experience primitive.
I am happy you are open to give some fundamental role to first persons
with respect to physical reality, but making them primitive would hide
the difficulties (certainly when assuming comp).

I am a realist, quasi sure about positive integers, and undecided for
the rest. I am not a physical realist but given that, possibly, all
there is are numbers I am open (like Plotinus, unlike Aristotle, but
like Peter Jones ! (alias 1Z)) to the idea that the big unameable one
is a 0 person notion. Intelligibility and sensibility should emerges
from inside like any points of view(*).

Bruno

(*) Technically through Kleene predicate or through universal
diophantine sets which embeds machines and computer science in number
theory.




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Received on Sun Jul 30 2006 - 08:23:24 PDT

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