Re: Bruno's argument

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2006 16:32:03 +0200

Le 26-juil.-06, à 07:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
>>> But certain computations are selected out through being isomorphic
>>> with physical structures and processes (or simulations thereof):
>> I would have said that certain computations are selected out by giving
>> high relative measure for locally stable consciousness experiences,
>> and
>> then those relative computations will defined what is physical from
>> inside. this explains (or at least makes it possible to explain) why
>> apparent physical laws are isomorphic to mathematical laws. The
>> physical would be the mathematical as seen from inside by mathematical
>> entities.
> I think I understand what you mean. If we say there is a physical
> world for the sake of argument, and then the whole thing suddenly
> disappears, there would be no way for a conscious being to know that
> anything had changed, because the computations underpinning his
> consciousness are unaffected: they still give the impression of a
> physical world.

With comp it have to be so. If it is actually is still an open problem,
despite some results.

> So the existence of a physical world somehow separate from mere
> mathematical entities is an unnecessary hypothesis.
>>> a parabola, the number three, a mind. We are happy to say that the
>>> first two of these are not "caused" by physical processes even when
>>> they manifest as if they are, and I think the same consideration can
>>> be applied to mind. What physical structures consciousness is
>>> isomorphic with and why is another question.
>> Consciousness would be isomorphic with relative or conditional average
>> on *all* computations, which can be made matematical by Church Thesis.
> This sounds right, but I have absolutely no idea where to start when
> we are talking about computations underlying consciousness. As Russell
> asked, why does it appear that they emanate from complex structures
> called brains? Why don't we perceive ourselves to be disembodied
> spirits, or to have heads solid like a potato?

stable "brains/ body/universes" are locally needed only to make it
possible for a consciousness or a first person to manifest
him/her/e/self with respect to a stable (high measure preserving)
So comp have to explain why Harry Potter and first person white rabbits
are relatively rare. This is still an open problem, but comp (Church
thesis mainly) makes it mathematical. What I have done is only a
reduction of the mind/body problem to a mathematical problem, + timid
advances toward a solution of that math problem, making comp testable
(and partially tested).
You are near the difficult questions which remains to be thoroughly
worked out ...


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Received on Wed Jul 26 2006 - 10:34:19 PDT

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