Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 21-juil.-06, à 17:52, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>
>>If there is anything left over. I don't think it is sufficiently
>>appreciated that this
>>"unknowability" is an assumption.
>
>
> No bigger than the "assumption" that "other" minds exists (a key
> assumption in comp if only through the trust to the doctor).
Aren't those two propositions independent - that there are other minds and that we cannot possibly
know what their experiences are like?
>
> And then it is a theorem that for any correct machine there are true
> propositions about them that the machine cannot prove.
And there are true propositions about itself that the machine cannot prove - but are they
"experiences"? Certainly there are myriad true propositions about what my brain is doing that I am
not, and cannot be aware of, but they aren't experiences.
Brent Meeker
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Received on Sat Jul 22 2006 - 16:04:29 PDT