Chris, this is a well thought out reponse, and it persuades me that
the difference between conciousness and nonconciousness could be as
little as the "inert block of wood", precisely because it is a
physically different system. It actually reminds me of the quantum 2
split experiment. An interference pattern is seen, or not seen
according to whether a detector placed at one of the slits is switched
on or not.
Maudlin's argument is important, but perhaps the conclusion is not so
"reductio ad absurdum" as initally thought.
Cheers
>
> I've finally had time to read Maudlin's paper, and I've gradually
> been catching up on your discussions on the Implementation thread,
> and I'd like to add my opinions to the mix. I've concluded that
> Maudlin's proof of the incompatibility between physical supervenience
> and a computational theory of consciousness, is without merit. I'll
> try to show where I think he made the errors in his argument.
> Hopefully soon I'll have time to apply this same analysis to some of
> the recent posts.
>
... Stuff deleted ...
>
>
> --
> Chris Maloney
> http://www.chrismaloney.com
>
> "Knowledge is good"
> -- Emil Faber
>
>
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Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Thu Jul 22 1999 - 19:54:47 PDT