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From: <hal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Mon, 19 Jul 1999 14:28:38 -0700

Wei Dai, <weidai.domain.name.hidden>, writes:

*> On Sun, Jul 18, 1999 at 02:35:03PM -0400, Jacques M Mallah wrote:
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*> > On Fri, 16 Jul 1999 hal.domain.name.hidden wrote:
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*> > > I can then apply your formula, letting x vary over all universes in U,
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*> > > computing sum over x of P(x)Q(x). I don't fully understand the meaning
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*> > > of the result, "the probability that I feel the way I do", but I wonder
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*> > > if this would be a valid alternative way of getting to it.
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*> >
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*> > That makes NO sense. If you say all 'universes' exist, that's the
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*> > same as saying one big universe exists. And if two copies of the same
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*> > computation give you twice the measure when they are in different
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*> > 'subuniverses', there's no reason that shouldn't be true in general.
*

Suppose I exist in universe A and I exist in universe B. Then the

contribution these two universes make to the overall "probability I feel

the way I do" is p(A) + p(B). If universe C is another universe that

happens to be identical to A joined to B somehow, then I exist in C.

The measure of C may or may not be related in a simple way to the

measures of A and B. (I am not making any assumptions here about how

measures are assigned to universes, in particular I am not assuming the

universal distribution.) So p(C) gets added to the mix.

I don't see anything contradictory in this.

*> I agree with Jacques Mallah here. Even if you could somehow distinguish
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*> between subuniverses (between which measures add up) and regions of
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*> subuniverse, there would be a subuniverse with high measure (e.g. the
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*> counting universe) that contains a copy of every other subuniverse as a
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*> region and it would dominate in your computation, leaving you with
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*> senseless results.
*

I agree that I exist in the counting universe. The counting universe

would have to have low measure for this model to be true. (Unless I

am actually living in the counting universe.)

I think you agree that you exist in the counting universe. However I

think you give low measure to the places in the counting universe where

you exist because they are so small compared to the universe as a whole.

Is that right?

I think Jacques does not agree that he exists in the counting universe.

He wants to see a "process", not a "pattern". It is not clear whether

a process can be fully represented as a pattern.

Hal

Received on Mon Jul 19 1999 - 14:35:26 PDT

Date: Mon, 19 Jul 1999 14:28:38 -0700

Wei Dai, <weidai.domain.name.hidden>, writes:

Suppose I exist in universe A and I exist in universe B. Then the

contribution these two universes make to the overall "probability I feel

the way I do" is p(A) + p(B). If universe C is another universe that

happens to be identical to A joined to B somehow, then I exist in C.

The measure of C may or may not be related in a simple way to the

measures of A and B. (I am not making any assumptions here about how

measures are assigned to universes, in particular I am not assuming the

universal distribution.) So p(C) gets added to the mix.

I don't see anything contradictory in this.

I agree that I exist in the counting universe. The counting universe

would have to have low measure for this model to be true. (Unless I

am actually living in the counting universe.)

I think you agree that you exist in the counting universe. However I

think you give low measure to the places in the counting universe where

you exist because they are so small compared to the universe as a whole.

Is that right?

I think Jacques does not agree that he exists in the counting universe.

He wants to see a "process", not a "pattern". It is not clear whether

a process can be fully represented as a pattern.

Hal

Received on Mon Jul 19 1999 - 14:35:26 PDT

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