>
> I realize and acknowledge that several of us have independantly rediscovered
> many consequences of the MWI, and I will not take that credit away from you.
> However, let me tell you my side of the story.
>
> I have written a whole book on the subject. Many of the ideas I have
> presented in this forum are lifted straight out this book. In it, I discuss,
> not just the RELATIVE aspects of consciouness but its RELATIVISTIC aspects,
> trying to merge the basic postulates of relativity with physical laws, the
> MW, the cosmological principle, information theory ( c.f., mutual or
> "relative" information), consciousness and free will. I explain how the
> relationship between our own rationality and the existence of rational
> physical laws. Fearing the nihilistic implications of this material, I also
> discussed ethics if such a theory was generally accepted. I started this book
> in June 1998 and finished the first draft in December 1998 before I connected
> with this group. At that time I sent queries to seven agents. They all turned
> me down.
>
> The book is too far out, too unbelievable, and I just don't have the
> credentials to be believed. If any one of you knows of a good way to publish
> such a book, please let me know.
>
> George Levy
>
You could publish it on the 'net, just as Max Tegmark did with his
paper. Then you can try to get some serious academic journals etc to
review the book. For instance, Max got a reference to his paper into
New Scientist. The issue here is to get other serious web sites
connected to yours, and people reading your stuff.
Cheers
>
>
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> From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
> Message-Id: <199907020058.KAA22238.domain.name.hidden>
> Subject: Re: Fwd: COUNTERFACTUALS
> To: GSLevy.domain.name.hidden
> Date: Fri, 2 Jul 1999 10:58:40 +1000 (EST)
> Cc: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> In-Reply-To: <d6d4f132.24ad1784.domain.name.hidden> from "GSLevy.domain.name.hidden.com" at Jul 1, 99
> 03:12:04 pm
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>
> GSLevey wrote:
>
> > This uncertainty in the decision making process IS what we perceive as FREE
> > WILL. Without this uncertainty we would just be automatons entirely
> > predictable and unthinking, actually, to be more precise, UNCONSCIOUSLY
> > THINKING, just like a program. Again this uncertainty is RELATIVE to the set
> > of axioms or rules or harware driving the thinking machine or brain...purely
> > in a Godelian sense. Free will can only exists in the eyes of the beholder
> > who has his own set of axioms, rules, hardware driving his own thinking
> > machine, brain..... And the beholder can be the self, or anyone else. Thus,
> > if a "thinking" entity behaves predictably with respect a second "thinking"
> > entity, then the first has no free will RELATIVELY to the second. A bull has
> > no free will when it faces a matador waving a red cape.
> >
>
> I think this comment is uncovering a profound link between free will
> and conciousness. MWI provides us with a natural solution to the free
> will vs determinism conundrum. (David Deutsch gives a good discussion
> of this in his FOR book). I have argued that a Turing machine
> can never be concious, because it can't have free will. The output
> states of the Turing machine are precisely given by the program and
> the inputs. One needs at least to inject a little randomness in the
> algorithm, which then offers a real choice between MWI branches for
> the machine to travel down. It is this possibility of choice that
> gives us our psychological sense of time, another important
> characteristic of conciousness, and is also naturally related to the
> arrow of time induced by the second law.
>
> However, the perverse flip side of this situation is that an
> unconcious Turing machine can implement a universe in which
> conciousness exists, at least this is how I understand Bruno's
> thesis. Of course the "time" in which the Turing machine executes its
> program is completely unrelated to the "time" that the concious
> entities implemented by the TM experience.
>
> Thus, it would seems, conciousness is very much a relative concept,
> just as free will and time would be.
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Dr. Russell Standish Director
> High Performance Computing Support Unit,
> University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
> Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 7123
> Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
> Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
> --part1_e938f202.24ae6da4_boundary--
>
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 7123
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Received on Sun Jul 04 1999 - 19:38:25 PDT