# Re: Fwd: COUNTERFACTUALS

From: Jacques M Mallah <jqm1584.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 1999 21:26:02 -0400

On Sun, 27 Jun 1999 GSLevy.domain.name.hidden wrote:
> In a message dated 99-06-25 17:55:59 EDT, Jacques Mallah wrote:
> << On 24 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> > Jacques M Mallah wrote:
> > > Suffice it to say, though, that whether the number of branches is
> > >finite or infinite makes little difference. The point is you lose measure
> > >with a QS.
> > >Some people in the multiverse have more measure than others,
> > >and measure is proportional to effective probability. If you deny this I
> > >don't see how you can even explain why people descended from apes have
> > >higher effective probability than those that form spontaneously.
> >
> > I do agree with the relation between measure and effective probability. >>

> Excuse my ignorance but what exactly is "effective" probability.

This has been discussed many times on the list. You could search
the archive message bodies.
The MWI is deterministic, so the standard idea of probability does
not apply. The effective probability of seeing X is the number of
observers who see X divided by the total number of observers.

> The real requirement [for consciousness] is rationality of consciousness

> One more issue about consciousness. It only exists in the eyes of the
> beholder.

Either it exists or it doesn't.

> In addition, you guys get confused with TIME. The characters in a movie or
> documentary are obviously not conscious when the movie is shown because they
> are incapable of rational thought or behavior in the real world at that time.

In other words, because the causal relationships aren't there,
just like we were saying.

> However, they are definitely conscious when the movie is recorded because
> they are rationally aware of their world.

If A then A. If not, not.

> Hal:
> >(My solution is, as I said earlier, that the question isn't meaningful,
> >because it is at best another iteration of an already-produced
> >calculation,
> >and it doesn't matter if a conscious calculation is instantiated multiple
> >times.)
>
> Jacques:
> >I obviously reject that.
>
> And this is the point where the idea of measure comes in. Is there any loss
> in measure if a playback absolutely identical with the original play is
> eliminated? Is there any gain in measure if the original play is repeated
> once, twice or a million times? In my opinion there is no loss and no gain.
> Consciousness is playback independent and is also time independent. You could
> implement it on a time share computer and it would not know the difference
> even if the active time intervals last one microsecond every billion years.
> As long as the rational link between the time segments is maintained.

What then is measure proportional to if not number of
implementations? Obviously it is not a constant as a function of
different computations, and all computations occur.

- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)