On Mon, 28 Jun 1999, Higgo James wrote:
> Clearly, in the view that I and George Levy have put forward, there is no
> difference between Bruno's machine and an 'actual conscious person'.
> Consciousness is an artefact of the anthropic principle; every planck-time
> those universes in which consciousness has not, by chance, been generated
> and maintained, are simply not perceived. But they are the overwhelming
> majority. And yes, that means that the pasts we remember are chance
> configurations of our memory. But of course such a past does indeed exist,
> as everything possible exists. So you can justifiably consider it to be an
> accurate record of 'previous' experiences. If you so choose.
Are you a 'structuralist like Wei Dai?
> But I can
> imagine Jacques Mallah howling his terrible howl, rolling his terrible eyes
> and stamping around his room.
Gee thanks.
> You say 'if A happens then B must happen according to the laws of physics'.
> Can you think of an example? Hume couldn't and I can't.
Yes, it is trivial to find examples. Maybe Hume didn't believe in
determinism?
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jacques "Wild Thing" Mallah [SMTP:jqm1584.domain.name.hidden]
> > Sent: Friday, June 25, 1999 10:49 PM
> > To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> > Subject: Re: COUNTERFACTUALS
> >
> > On 24 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> > > Jacques W. T. Mallah wrote:
> > > > Suffice it to say, though, that whether the number of branches is
> > > >finite or infinite makes little difference. The point is you lose
> > measure
> > > >with a QS.
> > > >Some people in the multiverse have more measure than others,
> > > >and measure is proportional to effective probability. If you deny this
> > I
> > > >don't see how you can even explain why people descended from apes have
> > > >higher effective probability than those that form spontaneously.
> > >
> > > I do agree with the relation between measure and effective probability.
> >
> > Good, maybe there is still some hope for you. (Yeah right.)
> >
> > > >> [BM] The problem is that Jacques M Mallah is computationnalist. I am
> > afraid
> > > >> that this entails he has no other choice than to choose the relative
> > SSA.
> > > >> Only by choosing a strong physicalist ontological principle AND by
> > > >> choosing a strong (and rather mysterious) link between consciousness
> > and
> > > >> physical activity, will it be possible for him to get a "limited MW"
> > in
> > > >> which branching is absolute. Such a link between consciousness and
> > > >> physical activity has been showed incompatible with mechanism (by
> > myself
> > > >> in 1988, and independently by Tim Maudlin in 1989, precise reference
> > in
> > > >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal.
> > > >
> > > > [JM] Yeah right. I wanted to see this crackpot proof only because
> > > >(unlike QS) it does directly touch on my interests, but unfortunately
> > it
> > > >was unreadable. So what's the idea of the "proof"? In English.
> > >
> > > 1) I like very much your sense of humor, Jacques. Do you really believe
> > > that
> > > I will be clearer in English ? ... and without drawings, and without
> > > hands waving ?
> >
> > Oui, je connais seulement un tres petite nombre des mots Francais.
> > Vraiment, je peut ecrire une mal paragraphe, mais je ne peut pas
> > comprehende les mots des autres.
> >
> > > 2) Is it necessary ? This very discussion list, as we can realize by
> > > looking at the beginning in the archive, is founded on the idea
> > > (see also Tegmark and Schmidhuber, and (of course) Everett !) that
> > > allowing more [every] things to exist makes possible the isolation of
> > > more [the most] simpler [simplest] explanation possible. This, I think,
> > > means that almost every one in the list accept some kind of
> > > conceptually strong form of Occam Razor (as explicitely,
> > > exemplified by James Higgo). With such an idea, there is no need for
> > > eliminating HE. Any arithmetical (abstract) DU is enough.
> >
> > If you're saying we all accept the everything hypothesis, that is
> > irrelevant. I think there's a good chance it's true, but it must be
> > proven that it gives the right predictions. I assume for now that the
> > debate about QS is in the context of QM, straight Shrondinger equation.
> > Besides, you also said that the proof would show why a "relative
> > SSA", which I think is nonsense in any context, is needed.
> >
> > > The problem here is that the "physics" cannot distinguish a
> > > counterfactually correct firing of a neuron (for exemple) and an
> > > accidentally correct firing of a neuron.
> >
> > Sure it can.
> >
> > > For exemple, think that
> > > the neuron is broken and that, by pure chance, a cosmic ray supplies
> > > it in real time.
> > > Then, if consciousness supervenes on the physical activity
> > > of a digital computer (emulating a brain), it will be not difficult
> > > to show that consciousness will supervene
> > > on a physically equivalent device, at some level below our substitution
> > > level,
> > > where the device is build in such a way -by filming the computer-
> > that
> > > all "computationnal activity" will be purely
> > > accidentally correct (like in a cartoon where the dropping of a stone in
> > > a window is NOT the cause of the breakdown of the window).
> > > That mean that consciousness could supervene on something equivalent to
> > a
> > > filmed brain, in which there is no form of "physical" computation at
> > all.
> >
> > As you noted in your next mail, this has been discussed on the
> > list many times already. Such a device would not implement the
> > computations and would not be conscious according to computationalism.
> > That's it? So much for your alleged proof. There's nothing in
> > it. It just presents an example of a physical situation in which a
> > computation is not implemented, and claims that consciousness would not be
> > present in that situation.
> >
> > > This is basically the idea of the reductio ad absurdum.
> >
> > Of course Wei Dai does not find it absurd; his position is that it
> > would be conscious. I'd call him a 'structuralist'.
> >
> > ><< Hal:
> > >It is not enough, in this view, to reproduce an instance of information
> > >processing in a non-causal way.
> >
> > Right.
> >
> > >(My solution is, as I said earlier, that the question isn't meaningful,
> > >because it is at best another iteration of an already-produced
> > >calculation,
> > >and it doesn't matter if a conscious calculation is instantiated multiple
> > >times.)
> >
> > I obviously reject that.
> >
> > >If we accept that consciousness is a real phenomenon deserving of
> > >explanation, this view would require that causality is also a real,
> > >fundamental, physical phenomenon.
> >
> > Right, the laws of physics must exist in addition to things such
> > as functions.
> >
> > >But if the only way causality can be
> > >defined is as a relationship that spans multiple universes, it would
> > >follow that consciousness also must fundamentally involve multiple
> > >universes. >>
> >
> > Nope. Causality is easy to incorporate into a one universe model.
> > Any initial value problem obviously has causality.
> >
> > (Bruno:)
> > >I will make a detailed comment about that ASAP. I agree with Hal but not
> > >on the point
> > >"it doesn't matter if a conscious calculation is instantiated multiple
> > >times", where it seems I am closer to Jacques M Mallah.
> >
> > Good, that will help you understand QS.
> >
> > - - - - - - -
> > Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
> > Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> > "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> > My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
>
Received on Mon Jun 28 1999 - 17:08:06 PDT