Re: Why physical laws

From: Marchal <>
Date: Fri Jun 11 02:41:58 1999

Gilles Henri wrote:

>Indeed I think we agree on what is the key point. Let me precise my
>position with respect to comp: I indeed think that conscious properties are
>related to computational properties. What I try to argue is
>1) that this computation can not be duplicated like an ordinary software
>like "Word6", because it is completely embedded (i.e. constantly in
>interaction with) an environment, and that, contrary to what is sometimes
>stated, a proper REAL simulation of the external Universe is impossible
>with a machine embedded in this very Universe.

With the negation of comp. Sure!

>2) that our notion of identity is NOT based on the computational identity
>but on the physical one (based on the apparent physical continuity of
>classical worlds through a time ordering), the computational continuity
>being just a secondary consequence of the physical one. In particular our
>own computational properties are constantly changing with time due to our
>increasing experience, although we consider that we are the same individual.

With some physicalist hypothesis (known to be in contradiction with
comp), sure!
>So you have in fact to POSTULATE that the physical reality is identical to
>its computation, before arriving to this conclusion. This postulate is
>acceptable, but it is really interesting only if it produces non trivial
>results, for example demonstrating m(C)>>m(B)....

I'm not sure I understand you here. If we succeed in demonstrating
m(C)>>m(B), we don't need to postulate any physical realities at all.
Remember that I postulate comp right from the start.

>I am not working in this field, but you should admit that the "cognitive
>scientists" have failed up to now to build a machine showing the slightest
>evidence of consciousness, and to explain it properly by human people. They
>may have missed something....

Correct but irrelevant, I think, for our theoretical investigation.

A+ Bruno.
Received on Fri Jun 11 1999 - 02:41:58 PDT

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