I'm just skimming atthe moment, but the idea of " universes
containing SAS apparently observing a environment without physical laws."
seems absurd. How can a process occur, such as the process of observing,
without athe necessary sequence appearing to obey laws?
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russell Standish [SMTP:R.Standish.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: Friday, June 11, 1999 3:08 AM
> To: marchal.domain.name.hidden
> Cc: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Subject: Re: Why physical laws
>
> > >
> > >I'll try to put it in more quantitative form. I assume I can give a
> > >"measure" of the set of possible Universes and separate it into three
> > >classes:
> > >A : the subset of universes without conscious beings
> > >B : the subset of universes containing SAS apparently observing a
> > >environment without physical laws.
> > >C : the subset of universes containing SAS apparently observing a
> > >environment with physical laws.
> > >
> > >It seems that we live in a C-Universe. Why?
> > >
> > >I guess (I may be wrong) that if you POSTULATE the existence of a
> reality
> > >obeying physical laws, you could hope to demonstrate
> > >m(A)>>m(C)>>m(B),
> > >because it is very improbable that conscious beings doing repeated
> physical
> > >experiments would be unable to unveil the existence of physical laws
> (for
> > >example by finding systematically very improbable results where the
> > >statistical distributions predicted by QM are never recovered).
> > >The observation of A is excluded by the (generalized) anthropic
> principle,
> > >so we explain satisfactorily why we see "C".
> > >
> > >However, I think that the "everything computable is realized"
> hypothesis
> > >would predict m(A)>>m(B)>>m(C), and so the reason why we are in C is
> much
> > >more mysterious with this hypothesis. Of course if you think you can
> > >justify also m(C)>>m(B) with comp, it would have the bonus to explain
> why
> > >physical laws exist (which must be postulated in the first stage), but
> I am
> > >really not convinced of that.
> >
> > My feeling, Gilles, is that you have an excellent understanding of my
> > point. Now, for some reason you don't believe in comp, and for that
> > reason, you take my counter-intuitive result as an opportunity to throw
> > away
> > the comp hypothesis.
> > Honestly that is a little too premature for me.
> > But I'm very glad you realise the bonus: an explanation of the origin of
>
> > physical laws.
> > But indeed, with comp (which is admitted by numerous people including
> > Schmidhuber, Deutsch, all cognitive scientist, etc.) we must justify
> > why m(C) >> m(B).
> > I don't pretend it is easy. I feel it worthwhile.
> >
> > You can try to prove that comp => m(C) << m(B). In that case, comp
> > will be refuted, once and for all.
> > You can try to prove that comp => m(C) >> m(B). In that case, you
> > will solve the mind body problem and the problem of the origin of the
> > physical laws.
> >
> > BTW, is it clear that with the quantum MWI we have prove that m(C) >>
> > m(B).
> > I guess the decoherent approach has put some light on that problem. But
> > here too, it is still not clear how far we are from a clearcut
> solution...
> >
> > Bruno.
> >
>
> I believe that the statement m(C) >> m(B) is related to the problem of
> why we should believe we have evolved by Darwinian evolution rather
> than just created "ex-nihilo" as Creation Scientists would have us
> believe.
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> --
> Dr. Russell Standish Director
> High Performance Computing Support Unit,
> University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
> Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 7123
> Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
> Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> --
Received on Fri Jun 11 1999 - 01:36:56 PDT