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From: Christopher Maloney <dude.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sat, 05 Jun 1999 07:58:34 -0400

In Tegmarks paper, section 3-B-2 discusses how this theory would

produce predictions that would, in principle, differ from the

predictions of any category 1b ontology. The key point is that

in order to determine the probability of any event, we must sum

over all of the possible mathematical structures we are in. That

is, we must take into account the fact that we aren't sure which

structure we are actually in.

He kept referring to us as existing firmly inside one

mathematical structure, and just not being sure which one that

is. But isn't it true that if multiple structures admit a

substructure identical to us, that we really exist in all of

those? How could we possibly say that we exist in one and not

the other? Further, couldn't our conscious selves "float" freely

from one structure to another, as we change over time? I'm not

sure if this consideration changes the probability equations

given by Tegmark.

In fact, I suspect that there are two isomorphic ways of

describing the situation. For example, in Quantum Mechanics, our

"structure" consists of the universal wave function, which admits

an infinite number of "worlds", in each of which events are

non-deterministic. But mightn't it be possible to describe the

same thing as a set of worlds, each of which has a definite

mathematical structure, and that our consciousness exists in

multiple worlds simultaneously, freely floating from one to

another?

Date: Sat, 05 Jun 1999 07:58:34 -0400

In Tegmarks paper, section 3-B-2 discusses how this theory would

produce predictions that would, in principle, differ from the

predictions of any category 1b ontology. The key point is that

in order to determine the probability of any event, we must sum

over all of the possible mathematical structures we are in. That

is, we must take into account the fact that we aren't sure which

structure we are actually in.

He kept referring to us as existing firmly inside one

mathematical structure, and just not being sure which one that

is. But isn't it true that if multiple structures admit a

substructure identical to us, that we really exist in all of

those? How could we possibly say that we exist in one and not

the other? Further, couldn't our conscious selves "float" freely

from one structure to another, as we change over time? I'm not

sure if this consideration changes the probability equations

given by Tegmark.

In fact, I suspect that there are two isomorphic ways of

describing the situation. For example, in Quantum Mechanics, our

"structure" consists of the universal wave function, which admits

an infinite number of "worlds", in each of which events are

non-deterministic. But mightn't it be possible to describe the

same thing as a set of worlds, each of which has a definite

mathematical structure, and that our consciousness exists in

multiple worlds simultaneously, freely floating from one to

another?

-- Chris Maloney http://www.chrismaloney.com "Knowledge is good" -- Emil FaberReceived on Sat Jun 05 1999 - 05:27:06 PDT

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