Re: Q Wars Episode 10^9: the Phantom Measure (fwd)

From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 1999 12:48:44 +1000 (EST)

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> From: Jacques M Mallah <jqm1584.domain.name.hidden>
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> Subject: Re: Q Wars Episode 10^9: the Phantom Measure
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> On 31 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> > I have probably missed something (in the 10^9 episodes!), but I still
> > cannot figure out why should "my" measure decrease with "time".
>
> At least, unlike some q-immorters, you admit that you do not think
> measure decreases with time.
>
> > At least with comp, it seems to me that the measure can only grow,
> > for I can have only a countable set of past histories, and (even "without
> > immortality") "I" have a uncountable set of futur "histories"
> > (continuations).
> >
> > If you (or any one else) could elaborate on this, and/or refer me to the
> > discussion-list, or to an URL, it would help me to understand the point.
>
> Before that, I want to establish a key point. Do you admit that
> if, in fact, your measure were to decrease (for example) exponentially
> with time, you would not be immortal in any meaningful sense?

I, for one, disagree with this. Immortality depends on continuity of
concious experience, not on measure. This depends (at least) on there
being at least one future history for each and every event. Now the
measure being discussed here is the proportion of events containing
your conciousness relative to the total number of events at the point
in time. Since the total number of events increases exponentially, if
not combinatorically with time, the fact that the measure is
diminishing in no way precludes the continuity of concious
histories. You argument would only work if the total number of
possible events remains constant, or diminishes with time.

> If you admit that, then we could have a discussion about whether
> measure does decrease or not. If you do not admit it, then we can't have
> much of a discussion since we apparently wouldn't be speaking the same
> language.
>
> > I'm still
> > open to the idea that such a measure doesn't exist (in wich case comp
> > would be false).
> > Where does your assurance come from ?
>
> If implementations of computations are well defined, I take the
> measure to be proportional to the number of such (there may be possible
> generalizations); more generally one could have a new law of physics to
> assign some other measure. If computationalism is false, one would need
> some new law to assign a measure on observations. Either way I don't see
> a problem with the idea of measure.
>
> - - - - - - -
> Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
> Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
>
>



----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 7123
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Tue Jun 01 1999 - 19:47:27 PDT

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