practical reasoning and strong SSA

From: Wei Dai <weidai.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 1999 01:36:51 -0700

When I learn a new way to thinking I tend to forget how to think the old
way. I just typed into Mathematica "N[Pi]" and it displayed to me
"3.14159". So I think that gives me reason to believe the first 6 digits
in the decimal expansion of Pi is 3.14159 because if it wasn't the case
my current experience would be very atypical. More formally, the
probability that I am reading "N[Pi] = 3.14159" given that the first 6
digits of Pi is not 3.14159 is very small compared to the probability that
I am reading "N[Pi] = 3.14159" given that the first 6 digits of Pi IS
3.14159.

This and similar kinds of reasoning depend on the Strong SSA (as defined
by Hal and Nick). I think it's strange that something that seems vital to
any kind of reasoning that takes into account sense experiences does not
have a more prominent place in philosophy. How do people who have never
heard of the Strong SSA or do not accept it justify believing that the
first 6 digits of Pi is 3.14159 (assuming they have evidence but not proof
of this fact) without reference to the Strong SSA?
Received on Tue Jun 01 1999 - 01:37:50 PDT