Thanks.. I await Bruno's comments on your post. I can't remember where you
go to join the everything list, but hopefully Wei Dai will have noticed this
e-mail and can add your e-mail address.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Chris Maloney and Sally Waters [SMTP:watermalon.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: Monday, May 24, 1999 11:29 AM
> To: Higgo James
> Subject: Re: We-Copy-U-Quick
>
> Higgo James wrote:
> >
> > This issue has been much discussed by Bruno Marchal; may I forward a
> copy to
> > him and others on the Tegmark everything-list?
>
> Of course. But tell me where that list is - perhaps I'd like to join.
>
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Chris Maloney and Sally Waters [SMTP:watermalon.domain.name.hidden]
> > > Sent: Sunday, May 23, 1999 10:36 PM
> > > To: avoid-l.domain.name.hidden
> > > Subject: Re: We-Copy-U-Quick
> > >
> > > First: a quick question. I posted this to this mailing list,
> > > although I considered replying "off-line". Did I do good? This
> > > post seems a little off-topic, so let me know if this sort of
> > > thing would be better sent directly, instead of to the list.
> > >
> > >
> > > Eric Hardison wrote:
> > > >
> > > > You have a sharp looking web site -- simplicity is best.
> > >
> > > Thanks!
> > >
> > > > I like your article about the nature of identity in your first issue
> of
> > > > "Watermelon Seed." (Where's the name from?) But I disagree with your
> > > > metaphysics.
> > >
> > > PUL-EEZE! It's "WaterMalon Seed"! The name is an amalgam of my
> > > and my wife's last names. Hers is "Waters" and mine is "Maloney",
> > > hence "WaterMalon". The "Seed" was a natural by-product, although
> > > I'm not sure, exactly, which came first ....
> > >
> > >
> > > > You definitely misinterpreted the scene from "Multiplicity." The
> > > > director is definitely a materialist.
> > >
> > > And I'm not?
> > >
> > > > When the copy of Keaton's
> > > > character awakens, he's an atom for atom copy and each atom is in
> the
> > > > same orientation as the original, including the brain. I don't know
> why
> > > > people distinguish the body and brain so much. The two are
> electrically
> > > > and chemically matched for each other. And the brain extends its
> "roots"
> > > > [nerves] throughout the body.
> > >
> > > Is this comment intended for me? I don't think I made any such
> > > distinction in my piece.
> > >
> > > > Anyway, this "new" biological machine creates the same "mind" as the
> > > > original. The "copy" has no way to know that it IS the copy. So when
> you
> > > > enter the copy-booth in LA, there's a 100% chance that two exact
> copies
> > > > of you will exist, one in America and one in England. From that
> point
> > > > on, the two copies will diverge, becoming more unique (but always
> more
> > > > alike than any set of identical twins). They don't have the "same"
> mind,
> > > > just identical minds. They are as distinct as you and I are. In
> fact,
> > > > the "copy" is shifted in time by however long it takes to transmit
> and
> > > > reassemble the "data" in London. So the copy's first moment of
> awareness
> > > > will be whatever you were thinking as you were copied, only the copy
> > > > will be thinking it perhaps 10 minutes later.
> > >
> > > Yes, I agree with all of this whole-heartedly, and I don't
> > > know where exactly you and I disagree. Also, could you say
> > > more about how I misinterpreted "Multiplicity"?
> > >
> > > > BTW, if you ever can't remember the name of a movie, it takes two
> > > > seconds to go to http://www.imdb.com/. They have info about EVERY
> single
> > > > movie or TV show ever made.
> > >
> > > Yes. Mea culpa.
> > >
> > > I've written more about this essay, and I was going to put it into
> > > the Seed #2, but I'm thinking that I'll hold off. But here it is,
> > > since it is relevant to your post:
> > >
> > > Last time (see Seed #1: Theseus' Ship)
> > > we learned that our conscious selves flow
> > > from one moment to the next into any one of a set of copies of
> > > ourselves. Let me recap that conclusion, in case the
> > > descriptions in that piece weren't adequate.
> > >
> > > I considered, in particular, a thought experiment involving two
> > > hypothetical devices. One was a transporter booth, and the
> > > other was a "copier" booth. Both booths look identical, both
> > > inside and outside. There is no way that you could tell the
> > > difference between them just by looking, the difference is in
> > > the guts of the machinery embedded within the devices.
> > >
> > > The transporter booth works as follows: the user steps
> > > into the booth in Annapolis, closes the door, and presses the
> > > red button. She then opens the door, and finds herself in an
> > > identical booth in another city (say, Baltimore). At the
> > > instant she presses the button, she doesn't feel the slightest
> > > jolt or movement. Until she opens the door, there is nothing
> > > that could tell her that she had arrived at the destination.
> > >
> > > That's the operation of the transporter booth
> > > from the user's perspective. What happens inside the guts of
> > > the machine is this: at
> > > the instant that the red button is depressed, the user is
> > > completely disintegrated, and the position and velocity of
> > > every molecule of hers is recorded (to the limit imposed by
> > > quantum uncertainty). Her body is then completely reassembled
> > > from material at the destination site, to an exact duplicate of
> > > her original self, down to the detail of the muscles of her
> > > index finger contracting to hold down the red button.
> > >
> > > This was the idea behind the transporter beam in Star Trek, and
> > > though most people didn't really think about it in detail, I
> > > think it's safe to say that most people would have agreed that
> > > this did, indeed, cause the person to be "transported".
> > > That is, from the user's subjective perspective, he or she
> > > would experience the use of the device as transportation from
> > > one place to the other.
> > >
> > > But if you think about it, some intriguing questions arise.
> > > How does the user's consciousness jump from one body to
> > > the other? If you believe in any sort of non-material soul,
> > > does the soul make the jump, as well? If so, how? If not,
> > > then does the body on the other end immediately fall down dead,
> > > even though it is perfectly physically healthy?
> > >
> > > Now let's consider the copy booth. As I mentioned, it
> > > looks identical to the transporter booth. Let's say that we
> > > have it set up to work as follows: when the user enters the
> > > booth in Annapolis and presses the red button, five identical
> > > copies of her will appear in five identical booths in five
> > > major cities: Baltimore, Chester, Dundalk, Easton, and
> > > Frederick. Furthermore, unlike the transporter booth, the
> > > original of herself is not disintegrated. The original remains
> > > intact and alive, as though nothing had happened. Each of the
> > > five copies, and the original, will step out of their
> > > particular booth and look about, to determine where she has
> > > ended up.
> > >
> > > So where does she end up? Note that the number five was
> > > chosen arbitrarily. I could just have easily said nine copies
> > > were made. Or zero. But if zero copies were made, then the
> > > booth would do nothing at all -- the user would of course find
> > > herself still in Annapolis, having pressed the button of a
> > > useless, broken, do-nothing booth.
> > >
> > > But what if five copies are made?
> > > Why should she experience anything different just because
> > > copies of her are created in remote cities, of which she may or
> > > may not be aware?
> > >
> > > What she would find, in fact, is that at the instant she
> > > presses the red button, she would be in affect rolling a die.
> > > She would have a 1/6 chance of ending up in each of the six
> > > destination cities (including the original's city, Annapolis).
> > > What she would experience, subjectively, is that the
> > > destination would be completely random, there would be no way
> > > for her to predict before-hand in which city she would arrive.
> > > The best that she could do, if she knew the way that the copy
> > > booths were distributed, would be to assign a 1/6 probability
> > > to each of the destination cities Annapolis, Baltimore,
> > > Chester, Dundalk, Easton, and Frederick.
> > >
> > > Note that the transporter booth is just a "special case" of the
> > > copy booth. Instead of six "destination cities", there is only
> > > one, which happens to be different from the original's city.
> > > So in that case, subjectively, she could say that there was a
> > > 100% chance that she'd end up in the destination city.
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Chris Maloney
> > > http://www.chrismaloney.com
> > >
Received on Mon May 24 1999 - 04:14:30 PDT