Re: who's on 1st

From: Gilles HENRI <Gilles.Henri.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 1999 09:45:52 +0200

>
> It's not necessary to simulate exactly 'your' behavior for all
>time.


  The point is that a human brain implements some digital
>computations. An analog system is perfectly capable of implementing
>digital computations; usually only for a certain set of initial
>conditions. The basic unit which is associated with consciousness
>is one time step of such a computation. To reproduce a particular
>observation - which you can call 'you' - you only need to implement the
>given computation by any means.

The question I raise is: how do you define different implementations of the
same person vs implementations of different persons (or thinking machines)?
That is another form of the question raised by Comp: at which level do you
think we ARE a computation? I think it is quite a fundamental issue before
talking about what happens when you realize "copies" of yourself, because
it can be that this level is so detailed that the actual implementation of
the same computation in the same world is in fact impossible.
In the common language, I see no other criterion that the physical
spatio-temporal continuity to define "identity", which excludes the
possibility of creating another you. If you meet somebody who insures you
that he is you, would you believe him and if not, why?

You seem to adopt a very large definition of "consciousness" (any
computation?) and "you" (any reproduction of any computation that you made
at any time?). As any definition, it is perfectly respectable. But it does
not fit into what is usually meant by these words in the all day life.

Gilles
Received on Thu Apr 22 1999 - 00:56:45 PDT