re:valuable errors

From: Gilles HENRI <Gilles.Henri.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 1999 14:35:35 +0200

>Gilles Henri:
>>What I'd like to stress is that even if infinite computing is a "practical"
>>possibility (the word "practical" should be carefully defined in that
>>context), it would not realize a duplication of an individual being in the
>>same world, but rather a duplication of the entire Universe. So it is
>>conceptually different of the COMP hypothesis of Bruno, which applies to
>>the generation of "clones" of yourself, who could eventually replace you.
>
>Perhaps I should insist that the comp hypothesis, as I conceive it, does
>not
>put any restriction on the level of substitution.
>Comp is still correct if the correct description of my brain is given by
>the complete quantum state of the "universe" (the multiverse).

My point was that
1) COMP can be correct only at this level (at least...)
and
2) then it forbids the ACTUAL copy of an individual being in our apparent
world.

if you agree, many discussions on this forum assuming a copy of people
become void of interest...

But in fact I think that if you give up the idea of simulating a perfect
copy of yourself (and ONLY yourself) with a computer (i.e. building another
"you" in our universe), that is if you admit that you need to simulate a
brain+its complete physical environment to reproduce its actual evolution,
you loose completely the "computer-like" nature of the brain. The COMP
hypothesis has now nothing to do with the fact that we are conscious. You
are only saying that physical laws are computable (I agree) and that their
computation is equivalent to their physical implementation for ANY system
(not only conscious beings). That's the strong assumption. So it's not
surprising that you end up with the last conclusion...which was in fact an
hypothesis included in Comp from the beginning.

BTW there is still an unanswered question. The mystery of consciousness
comes from the fact that with mechanism, human beings and brain are
nothing else than ordinary matter (whatever the latter can be). So why is
consciousness specifically attached to this matter? If with Comp you need
to simulate a complete Universe to reproduce brain evolution, you face the
same mystery, because the brain would be made of the same kind of
computation as the whole physical Universe. So the question remains.


>If you appeal to "spatio-temporal" continuity here, you are begging the
>question. Only if comp is false can such an argument be use to define a
>non
>computational -may be correct, but outside the scope of my working
>hypothesis- definition of identity.
.....
>The main problem here is to understand our motivation, I mean the
>motivation
> of those who are searching for a *theory of everything*.
>I do not accept a theory of everything which put the "problem of
>consciousness" under the rug. And once you mind seriously the
>consciousness
> problem with comp, you eventually realise that it is much more easy to
>explain where our beliefs in "physical structures" come from than to
>explain
> how a *subjective* belief can be *attached" to anything *material*.
>
>Gilles, you said elsewhere in this discussion that you don't take
>the physical laws for granted. But if you base an identity criterion on
>things like "physical continuity" you will enter into a loop...

I don't know the nature of space and time and why there are physical laws.
I just know that they appear to exist - in our perception of Universe. So
are us. By defining identity, which is in all manner an appearance, you
must refer to what we can measure, which is certainly not the ultimate
reality. In the discussion with James we were really speaking of the
possibility of creating another "you" and try to define what we mean by
that. I don't think you can give a definition of what is "you" without
referring to a spatio-temporal frame, just like you cannot define what an
"eddy" is without referring to a fluid flow, whatever fluids are made of.
 Again a more profound theory (like statistical mechanics) must be able to
decribe how the approximate quantities (like velocity, density) emerge from
the deeper level. That's what I miss in Comp. I don't see how the physical
appearance (space, time, matter ) emerges from a succession of 0 and 1. But
you already told me that your goal was not to find a better physical
theory, and I already answered you that then it belongs to the field of
metaphysics, and that I doubt that anything useful can emerge from that...
A+

Gilles
Received on Wed Apr 21 1999 - 05:45:09 PDT