>I see, it is a good attempt at restricting the difinition of identity but it
>has two main problems:
>1. It excludes what Bruno and I would include.
It is not a problem for me.
>2. Must each molecule be mapped on to another molecule in the subsequent
>universes one planck-time hence? How much deviation is allowed before we say
>that the correlation is so poor that it is not 'you' in that universe?
This problem appears for any macroscopic category, exactly like the
definition of a sand heap. It would also be present in a hypothetical
teleportation, because you have to define at WHICH level you must duplicate
the original to preserve identity. (Bruno does not give any answer ; he
assumes that this level exists without precision).
I think in fact it is much easier to define the continuity with my
definition, because it relies on the physical continuity which is
automatically insured by physical laws. The mapping of two Planck-scale
separated universes is given by the condition that ALL particles propagates
(or seem to propagate) over a Planck scale, irrespectively of their
belonging to your body. Then you have to adopt a definition of you , for
example by assuming a physical continuous closed surface which encloses
your body. Of course there is a small uncertainty. You can discuss at what
time a water molecule evaporating from your skin has really left you, but
it doesn't seem very important. Any reasonable surface within a few microns
of your skin will work! Now the functional identity (the fact that you feel
"you" all along your life) is a mere consequence of the physical laws
applied to your interior, not an "a priori" criterion to define it like in
COMP.
I think this is the usual way by which we define ANY object, not only
thinking persons. As I argued the identity of objects is usually attached
to their physical continuity, not their functionality.
Gilles
Received on Wed Apr 21 1999 - 01:12:22 PDT
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