On 16 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> Suppose now some person, X0, is copied in (exactly) 1O instances. She should
> expect their future selves to be effectively randomly chosen, as you say,
> among the 10 instances: X1, ... X10. (or 11 if the original is not
> destroyed).
>
> Do you agree that, whatever the means used to quantify the indeterminism,
> the immediate expectation of X will not depend:
> a) neither of the "real"/virtual nature of the reconstitution,
> b) nor of the absence or presence of finite delay of reconstitution?
I don't know where you're going with this. It's all a special
(conditional) case of the fact that a typical observer is effectively a
randomly chosen observer. (Weighted by the measure which I take to be
proportional to the number of implementations.)
a) If the computation is implemented, it's implemented. I guess
you mean it wouldn't depend on how closely the person's world view matched
the physical reality.
b) Obviously such a delay would not be detectable.
- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL:
http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Received on Fri Apr 16 1999 - 11:36:25 PDT