Re: valuable errors

From: Jacques M Mallah <>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1999 14:33:43 -0400

On 16 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> Suppose now some person, X0, is copied in (exactly) 1O instances. She should
> expect their future selves to be effectively randomly chosen, as you say,
> among the 10 instances: X1, ... X10. (or 11 if the original is not
> destroyed).
> Do you agree that, whatever the means used to quantify the indeterminism,
> the immediate expectation of X will not depend:
> a) neither of the "real"/virtual nature of the reconstitution,
> b) nor of the absence or presence of finite delay of reconstitution?

        I don't know where you're going with this. It's all a special
(conditional) case of the fact that a typical observer is effectively a
randomly chosen observer. (Weighted by the measure which I take to be
proportional to the number of implementations.)
        a) If the computation is implemented, it's implemented. I guess
you mean it wouldn't depend on how closely the person's world view matched
the physical reality.
        b) Obviously such a delay would not be detectable.

                         - - - - - - -
              Jacques Mallah (
       Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
            My URL:
Received on Fri Apr 16 1999 - 11:36:25 PDT

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