Bruno Marchal:
> I know that you present yourself as a computationalist, but just to clear
> things up, does it mean you are willing to accept a substitution of your
> brain (or body) by a digital one, at some level of substitution?
Jacques M Mallah:
> I don't know why that would be unclear. In my view, in principle,
>a digital computer could simulate me in all the important respects and
>could be conscious.
OK, so you agree that a computationalist could, in case it is
technologically feasible, use teletransport to "move" herself.
Remember that the "original" is destroyed, and "reconstituted" elsewhere.
I guess you agree that if someone survives teletransport, she will still
survives teletransport in case of multiple and independent
reconstitutions.
Now, you were saying that the "entrenched trivial" errors concerns the
measure issue.
Could you tell me if there is already an "entrenched trivial error" for
those who believes, like myself, that if people tell us in advance that
there will be multiple reconstitutions, then, before teletransportation,
their "immediate" futur is undetermined ?
This is what I like to call Mechanist or Computationnalist Indeterminism.
So my question is "do you believe in Mechanist Indeterminism ?".
Bruno
Received on Wed Apr 14 1999 - 03:08:22 PDT
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