Re: all of me or one of me

From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu Apr 8 02:47:57 1999

GH:
>It is not against these theories. The many-worlds hypothesis + a
>mathematical constraint such as analyticity of fields could lead to an
>"everything possible" hypothesis that would imply that all possible worlds
>are also different everywhere, so "clone free"...

BM:
This would make the "many-worlds hypothesis" empty. If the worlds
are so different, how will interference be possible ?

GH:
> ... it relies on the hypothesis that you think you will
>really be , or "identify yourself to", one of your copy, which is
>contestable, especially if you consider that no copy can be exact.

BM:
Remember that with comp we are by definition informatical (in the
classical sense) entity, and we are (from a third person point of view)
100% exactly duplicable. (In the same sense that you can make *in
principle* a perfect copy of the 10E100 first decimal of PI).

GH:
>You
>could also think that you will die whatever, and choose B just by
>compassion with other copies.

BM:
Indeed, but it is better, if only for the sake of the argument,
to presuppose a minimal amount of selfishness.

GH:
>For example, just
>modify a little bit your experiments: you won't be destroyed, but you will
>be put in the unique "paradise" box in A and in the unique "hell" box in B.
>The other 999999 copies will be placed in the hell or paradise boxes,
>respectively. Unless you are a saint, and without misprint, won't you
>choose "A"? It would mean that you care less about your copies than about
>yourself...

BM:
I will not choose A, because with comp, a teleportation without
annihilation of the original is equivalent with a duplication where the
original is destroyed. So, with comp, your experiment is equivalent to
mine!
I have no doubt that this is rather counter-intuitive. But comp, if true,
is necessarily *unbelievable*.

A+ Bruno.
Received on Thu Apr 08 1999 - 02:47:57 PDT