RE: all of me or one of me

From: Higgo James <james.higgo.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 1999 10:36:44 +0100

If Deutsch is right, we are passing through 10E43 different 'me's' every
second. Which one should I care about most?

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Marchal [SMTP:marchal.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: Saturday, March 06, 1999 4:10 PM
> To: Gilles HENRI; everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Subject: Re: all of me or one of me
>
> Gilles Henri wrote:
> >But what is the meaning of two identical Universes ? should they not be
> >identified as a single one?
>
> Yes, at least FAPP (For All Practical Purposes).
>
> >And if the Universe are slightly different, what is the meaning of
> "copies
> >of yourself"? Should not anybody consider himself as a unique copy of a
> >single being, even if you share the same past with other beings (like
> >normal twins) ? You could consider that two Universes could be locally
> >identical but different outside some region, but it is not that obvious.
> >For example if the physical fields are analytical they must be either
> equal
> >everywhere or different in any neighborhood of any point....
>
>
> Perhaps but it is relevant with Wei Dai question only as an argument
> against either MWI, comp or everything-like realm or theory.
> Nevertheless, with comp or MWI, there is a question.
>
> Wei Dai asks:
>
> "Given the MWI or one of the "everything" theories we've discussed, the
> universe must contain multiple observers who have exactly the same
> memories and experiences as you do. Should you identify with all of them,
> or should you think, "I am one of these people, but I don't know which"?"
>
> Now, if all the Worlds are identical, you are right, we can identified
> these worlds with a single one, at least FAPP.
> When the worlds diverges, we cannot make these identifications and, my
> feeling here, is that Wei Dai is correct when he proposes that we should
> think:
> "I am one of these people, but I don't know which".
>
> Let us look another illustration with a thought experiment.
> Suppose I give you the choice between the experiments A and B (and
> nothing else!):
> In both experiments you are destroyed after being "read" (your
> description is encoded on some disk) and then you are reconstituted in 1
> 000 000 boxes which are put at some places. The boxes are, from inside,
> undistinguishable. There is a door in all the boxes.
>
> In experiment A, one box is put in *paradise* and 999 999 are put in
> *hell*.
> In experiment B, one box is put in *hell* and 999 999 are put in
> *paradise*.
>
> (I suppose also that the different places in *hell* (resp. *paradise*)
> are distinctibles. Let us call that the DISTINCT hypothesis)
>
> What will you choose ?
>
> I would answer: if for some reason I know I will never open the door, I
> don't care and I can choose between A and B randomly. If I know I WILL
> open the door then I choose A.
> Put in another way: untill I open the door I can identify myself
> (*my-futur-self*) with all the copies FAPP, but once I open the door
> then I identify myself with one of those copies, and I don't know which
> one in advance. But I do have some "information" helping me in my choice.
>
> Do you agree ?
>
> Are there some computationnalist or many-worlders who disagrees?
>
> Another question is what will happen if we relax the DISTINCT hypothesis.
> With both comp and MWI there are senses in which we can erase memories,
> making possible for the "corresponding worlds" to fuse, and making the
> "uncertainty quantification" more difficult to define.
>
> Bruno
>
Received on Wed Apr 07 1999 - 02:39:10 PDT